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Returns to momentum strategies can be decomposed into three sources of return: positive 
autocovariances in returns, negative cross-covariances in returns and cross-sectional variation in 
unconditional expected returns across assets. While theoretical literature on momentum generally 
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this prior literature ignores a key empirical issue related to short return histories and extreme return 
observations. These extreme returns cause a negative bias to sample estimates of return autocovariances 
and cross-covariances, and a positive bias to the cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected 
returns. Furthermore, prior literature focuses on portfolios of stocks instead of individual stocks, 
because the decomposition requires estimating a cross-covariance matrix, which is difficult for 
individual stocks with short and non-overlapping return histories. 
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behavioral theories on momentum but does not preclude a rational interpretation. When the 
contributions are allowed to vary over time, positive autocovariances consistently remain the most 
important driver of momentum returns throughout the sample period. However, the time-series 
predictability in individual stock returns slowly erodes after momentum is initially documented in the 
literature in 1993, potentially explaining the poor recent performance of momentum. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Momentum, the tendency of assets that have performed well recently to outperform 
assets that have done poorly recently, is a robust and pervasive phenomenon. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find, that strategies buying stocks with high returns over 
the past 3 to 12 months and selling stocks with low returns over the same horizon, 
produce statistically significant and economically large positive returns over 
subsequent months. Subsequent literature documents momentum being a robust and 
pervasive phenomenon that is present in both markets outside the US, as well as asset 
classes outside of stocks.1 The robustness of the evidence on momentum has led to an 
extensive amount of theories proposed in the literature aspiring to explain momentum.  
These theories can be roughly divided into behavioral and rational theories. Behavioral 
theories on momentum posit, that momentum arises due to irrational behavior by 
market participants.2 A common interpretation is that momentum is caused by 
underreaction to firm- or asset-specific information by market participants, which in 
some theories, is followed by an overreaction. Theories based on rational expectations 
interpret momentum as compensation for some underlying risks, not accounted for by 
traditional asset pricing models.3 
                                                 
1 Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find momentum in industry portfolios, and Lewellen (2002) 
documents similar evidence with portfolios sorted on market capitalization and book-to-market ratios. 
Momentum is also present in markets outside the US (Rouwenhorst (1998), Asness, Moskowitz & 
Pedersen (2013)), as well as in asset classes other than stocks (Asness, Moskowitz & Pedersen (2013), 
Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov & Stahel (2013)). Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012) document a related 
time-series momentum phenomenon and find it to be persistent across multiple asset classes and 
markets. 
2 Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Luo, Subrahmanyam and Titman (2018) and Barberis, 
Schleifer and Vishny (1998) attribute momentum to different cognitive biases, which cause investors to 
underweight new publically available information. Hong and Stein (1999) suggest a model with both 
under- and overreaction, with gradual diffusion of information among investors. Grinblatt and Han 
(2005) and Frazzini (2006) argue that the disposition effect causes excess selling pressure on past 
winners and undersupply on past losers, which leads past winners (losers) to become under- (over-) 
valued. 
3 Berk Green and Naik (1999) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) suggest that systematic exposures 
to a set of macroeconomic risk factors explain momentum. Johnson (2002), Sagi and Seasholes (2007) 
and Liu and Zhang (2008) relate momentum to time-varying risk exposures, positing that a firms cash 
flows become more risky after facing recent growth. Ahn Conrad and Dittmar (2003) provide another 
explanation based on time-varying risk exposures, while Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002) build a 
rational model of momentum based on information asymmetry. Another branch of the literature 
proposes new risk factors that might explain momentum at least to a degree (see e.g. Hou, Xue & Zhang 
(2015), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Ruenzi and Weigert (2018) and Sadka (2006)). 
7 
Recently, Subrahmanyam (2018) calls for more empirical work towards thinning out 
the large number of competing theories on momentum. Testing many theories jointly 
is difficult, however, because each theory generates a wide range of testable 
predictions. This thesis focuses on one very specific aspect of momentum, which is 
relevant to all theories: the return mechanism that causes momentum. Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990) suggest an analytical decomposition of strategies that weight assets 
in proportion to their past returns. This decomposition reveals that returns to 
momentum can arise in three ways: 1. Returns have positive autocovariances i.e. an 
asset’s past returns positively predict its subsequent returns. 2. Returns have negative 
cross-covariances, such that high (low) returns to some asset predicts low (high) 
returns to some other asset. 3. Momentum strategies on average weight positively on 
assets with higher unconditional expected returns and negatively on assets with lower 
unconditional expected returns. If the cross-sectional variation in unconditional 
expected returns is large, momentum generates significant positive returns. 
Virtually all behavioral theories in the literature, but some rational ones as well, imply 
that momentum is driven by positive autocovariances in returns. Some rational theories 
suggest, that variation in unconditional expected returns drives momentum instead. 
Negative cross-covariances have largely been ignored by the literature as a potential 
driver of momentum. However, prior empirical evidence on the return decomposition 
is inconsistent with positive autocovariances driving momentum. Conrad and Kaul 
(1998), Bulkley and Nawosah (2009) and Park and Kim (2014) find evidence in 
support of cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected returns driving 
momentum in individual stocks. Lewellen (2002) studies portfolio-level momentum 
and finds evidence consistent with momentum being driven by negative cross-
covariances. Du (2012) finds similar evidence for momentum in individual stocks. 
Pan, Liano & Huang (2004) find positive autocovariances in industry portfolios only 
for lags up to three months but negative autocovariances at longer horizons. 
Prior literature on decomposing momentum returns focuses mainly on momentum in 
portfolios of stocks, because the standard decomposition requires an estimate of the 
cross-covariance matrix of returns. Estimating the cross-covariance matrix for 
individual stocks is difficult, because there are a large number of individual stocks 
with short and non-overlapping return histories. I contribute to prior literature by 
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proposing two methods to tackle this problem. The first one involves estimating the 
decomposition by limiting the sample of stocks into stocks with 24 months of common 
return history and estimating the decomposition in a moving window. The second 
method is a strategy-based decomposition of momentum returns, novel to the 
literature. I analytically solve for the weights to three investment strategies that target 
each of the three return mechanisms related to momentum separately. Unlike the 
standard decomposition, the strategy-based decomposition does not require an 
estimate of the cross-covariance matrix and can be estimated with relative 
computational ease. 
The inconsistency between empirical evidence and theories on the return mechanism 
is puzzling. Chen and Hong (2002) argue that prior findings of negative 
autocovariances are caused by investors overreacting to market-wide news, while 
underreacting to firm-specific information. However, they provide only minimal 
empirical support. I provide a different interpretation of prior findings. Prior literature 
uses sample estimates of autocovariances, cross-covariances and the cross-sectional 
variation in unconditional expected returns. These sample estimates have been shown 
to be sensitive to extreme observations, potentially causing bias in estimating the 
decomposition.4  
I empirically test for the presence of biases in the decomposition in US individual 
stocks and portfolios of US stocks, by conducting a bootstrap experiment. I sample 
individual return observations to generate return series' with no time-series 
predictability in returns and form momentum strategies on these scrambled returns. 
The returns on these strategies should only depend on the cross-sectional variation in 
unconditional expected returns. However, decomposing the returns to these strategies 
reveals a significant negative contribution by return autocovariances and significant 
positive contribution by return cross-covariances. This evidence suggests that sample 
estimates of the contribution of autocovariances are negatively biased, while estimates 
                                                 
4 Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) show that sample estimates of the cross-sectional variation in 
unconditional expected returns are positively biased by extreme return observations and short return 
histories. Chan (1992, 1995) and Deutsch, Richards and Swain (1990) show that very few outlier 
observations can cause considerable bias in sample esimates of autocovariances. 
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of the contributions of cross-covariances are positively biased. In addition, I replicate 
the results of Jegadeesh and Titman (2002), who show that sample estimates for the 
cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected returns are positively biased. When 
returns are sampled without replacement, such that extreme return observations cannot 
enter into both the holding and formation periods, the returns of the scrambled 
momentum strategies are very small and statistically insignificant for both individual 
stocks and industry portfolios, suggesting that the variation in unconditional expected 
returns does not drive momentum returns. 
Re-estimating the decomposition and the bootstrap experiment using winsorized 
returns, where extreme returns are pulled in, provides moderate evidence suggesting 
that these biases are caused by extreme return observations. However, the strategy-
based decomposition provides a more intuitive way to control for the biases. The 
strategy-based decomposition allows for an interpretation of the biases in the 
decomposition as forward-looking biases. Using ex-ante available information to form 
these component strategies results in unbiased estimates of the decomposition, 
regardless of whether the biases are caused by extreme returns or some other 
phenomena. 
I empirically examine the strategy-based decomposition in a sample of US individual 
stocks and portfolios of US stocks, sorted by industry, size and book-to-market ratios 
extending from 1928 to 2018. My main findings support the view that momentum is 
mostly driven by positive autocovariances in returns. Using the strategy-based 
decomposition, positive return autocovariances are the only driver of momentum that 
an investor can target to earn significant positive returns using information available 
ex-ante. Furthermore, the cross-covariance strategy is negatively correlated with both 
momentum and the autocovariance strategy, while the autocovariance strategy is 
positively correlated with momentum. These correlations are strong and provide 
further evidence that negative cross-covariances do not drive momentum returns. 
However, when momentum returns are regressed against component strategy returns, 
momentum has a large positive regression intercept over all component strategies, 
suggesting that these component strategies do not capture momentum in its entirety.  
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Momentum driven by positive autocovariances is consistent with most behavioral 
theories on momentum. Furthermore, a number of rational theories predict this 
relationship as well. Thus, while my results address some puzzling empirical results in 
prior literature, they do not significantly reduce the number of plausible theories for 
momentum. Because different theories on momentum generate varying testable 
hypotheses, evaluating theories jointly remains an important challenge in 
understanding momentum. 
My main results are robust across market capitalizations of individual stocks and a 
variety of other methodological choices. Furthermore, results for industry portfolios 
and individual stocks are consistent with each other, suggesting that momentum in 
individual stocks and industry momentum are similar phenomena. Evidence for size 
and book-to-market sorted portfolios suggests that momentum in these characteristic-
sorted portfolios is distinct from momentum in indivual stocks and industry portfolios 
and more driven by variation in unconditional expected returns, related to size and 
value factor returns. A further examination of momentum in these characteristic sorted 
portfolios is left for future research, however. 
Another advantage of the strategy-based decomposition is that it naturally allows for 
time-variance in the return mechanism. Exploring time-variance, I find that positive 
autocovariances, are consistently the most important driver of momentum returns in 
individual stocks throughout the sample period. While negative return cross-
covariances seem to generate positive momentum returns at times in the latter part of 
the sample, negative return autocovariances dominate the cross-covariances resulting 
in poor performance of momentum strategies. I also uncover some evidence suggesting 
that time-series predictability in returns steadily erodes after 1990, placing concern 
over the profitability of momentum strategies in the future. My findings are consistent 
with McLean and Pontiff (2016), who find, that cross-sectional return predictability 
tends to attenuate post-publication. 
The strategy-based decomposition also reveals a novel reversal phenomenon in 
individual stocks akin to the long-term reversal effect first documented by DeBondt 
and Thaler (1985). I find that a contrarian strategy that invests long in stocks with low 
lifetime historical returns and short in stocks with high lifetime historical returns earns 
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statistically significant and economically large positive returns consistently throughout 
the sample period. The returns to this contrarian strategy are similar when estimates of 
unconditional expected returns are formed using full lifetime returns, excluding the 
holding period return, and when estimates are formed using only post-holding period 
returns. This suggest that stocks with extremely high (low) individual monthly return 
realizations earn lower (higher) than average returns over their lifetime. My findings 
add to prior empirical evidence on investors requiring a return premium for holding 
stocks with negatively skewed returns over stocks with positively skewed returns 
(Bali, Cakici & Whitelaw, 2011 and Boyer, Mitton & Vorkink, 2010). 
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. I review prior literature on 
momentum, including the empirical evidence, the most important theories and 
empirical tests of these theories in section 2. In section 3, I outline my research 
questions and my contribution to prior literature. I describe my data and main methods 
in section 4. In section 5, I present my empirical results. I conclude in Section 6. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, I review prior literature related to cross-sectional momentum in stock 
returns, henceforth referred to as momentum. I begin with a brief overview of early 
work on cross-sectional asset-pricing and the evidence on the momentum anomaly. I 
then discuss different explanations for the momentum phenomenon suggested in the 
literature and provide a summary of literature examining different cross-sectional and 
time-series attributes and determinants of momentum strategies. I conclude the 
literature review with a discussion of the decomposition of momentum returns into 
distinct drivers of returns and a review of prior evidence related to the decomposition. 
2.1 Efficient markets and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Much of the early paradigm of asset pricing literature builds on the efficient market 
hypothesis. In his influential survey of efficient markets literature, Fama (1970) 
defines efficient market as one where prices fully reflect all available information. 
When all available information is reflected in prices immediately, prices follow an 
unpredictable “random walk”, and no systematic investment strategy can earn 
abnormal returns. Under efficient markets, the return available to any investor is 
always proportionate to the risk taken on by the investor.  
A large body of empirical work is dedicated to examining the efficient market 
hypothesis. Testing market efficiency has proven difficult, however. Testing market 
efficiency requires a benchmark model that expected returns should follow if markets 
are efficient. Because of this, any test of market efficiency faces a joint hypothesis 
problem. As Fama (1970) points out, tests of market efficiency simultaneously test 
market efficiency and the validity of the benchmark model of asset price formation. 
Thus, it is difficult to assess whether a finding indicates inefficiencies in the market, 
or whether the benchmark model is an insufficient model of the risk-reward 
relationship in expected returns. 
In an early effort to quantify the risk-reward relation and to provide a benchmark for 
tests of market efficiency, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) develop the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (from now on CAPM for short). The central assertion of the CAPM is 
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that the cross-sectional variation in expected returns can be explained by a function of 
each assets’ covariance with the aggregate market return. In theory, the market return 
should include returns on all investable assets, including not just stocks and bonds, but 
other investments such as real estate as well. However, most empirical research on 
stock returns typically use a value-weighted portfolio of stocks traded in the U.S. as a 
proxy for this market factor. The CAPM has been a widely used benchmark 
equilibrium model of asset prices in subsequent literature. 
Despite being an important landmark in asset pricing theory, empirically the CAPM 
has not been a success. For example, Fama and French (1992, 1993) do not detect the 
connection between market betas and future stock returns predicted by the CAPM. 
Subsequent literature also identifies predictability in the cross-section of stock returns 
not related to market betas. These patterns are often referred to as anomalies. Harvey, 
Liu and Zhu (2016) explore asset pricing literature and find over 300 variables 
suggested to explain the cross-section of stock returns. Some of the earliest and most 
well-known studies show that market capitalization (Banz, 1981), book-to-market-
ratios (Rosenberg, Reid, & Lanstein, 1985), and past returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993) all predict variation in future returns. In light of these findings, many 
improvements upon the CAPM have been suggested in the literature. For example, 
Fama and French (1992, 1993) add two additional factors to the CAPM, based on 
market capitalization and book-to-market ratios. The resulting three-factor model is 
widely used as a benchmark model in subsequent anomalies literature.  
2.2 Momentum 
Momentum is one of the most studied phenomena in the anomalies literature. In the 
context of stock markets, momentum can be broadly defined as the tendency of stocks 
with higher returns over the intermediate horizon (3 to 12 months), to outperform 
stocks with lower returns over the same horizon in subsequent months for up to a year. 
The discovery of momentum in stock returns is most often credited to Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993), although similar concepts were explored earlier, for example by Levy 
(1967) with his relative strength strategies. In their seminal paper, Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) consider strategies that sort stocks into portfolios based on their realized 
return over the past 3 to 12 months and then buy the portfolio with the highest recent 
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realized returns and sell short the portfolio with the lowest returns. They find that the 
resulting zero-investment portfolios yield economically large and statistically 
significant returns that are not explained by the CAPM. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
study various formation periods, as well as various holding periods. Their strategies 
also hold multiple portfolios simultaneously. The largest returns to an individual 
strategy documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) are 1.31% per month, with a 12-
month formation period and a holding period of 3 months following immediately after 
the formation period. The approach based on overlapping portfolios in Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) is uncommon in subsequent literature. Asness, Moskowitz and 
Pedersen (2013) posit that the most standard approach in the literature is to form 
momentum portfolios based on 11-month cumulative return of a stock, during the 
period beginning 12 months prior and ending one month prior to portfolio formation. 
The rationale for skipping one month between the holding period and the momentum 
period is the tendency of previous performance over periods from one week to one 
month to be negatively related to following performance. This short-term reversal 
effect is documented by Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990). DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985) uncover another similar reversal effect, when predicting future returns with 
longer-term (one to five years) past performance. Bali, Engle, and Murray (2016 p. 
209-219) show that the choice of formation period and holding period has some effect 
on the magnitude of momentum returns. The 11-month cumulative return with one 
month skipped in between the formation and holding periods generates the highest 
returns in their sample of US stocks from 1963 to 2012. 
Following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), a broad literature posts evidence of 
momentum being a persistent and pervasive phenomenon. Rouwenhorst (1998) 
replicates Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) in 12 European countries and finds similar 
results. Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003) and Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) look for 
evidence around the world and find significant and positive momentum returns in most 
countries. Both find, that momentum tends to be weaker in Asian countries. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and Lewellen (2002) document momentum in 
portfolios of U.S. stocks. Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) show that 
momentum exists not just across international stock markets, but in and across 
different asset classes, such as equity indices, currencies, commodity futures and 
government bonds as well. Jostova, Nikolova and Philipov (2013) document 
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momentum in non-investment grade corporate bonds. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
and Israel and Moskowitz (2013) find that momentum has remained profitable in post-
publication periods as well. 
Momentum returns tend to also survive most common risk-adjustments. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) show, that momentum returns are not explained by exposure to market 
risk. Fama and French (1996, 2008, 2016) find that momentum profits remain strong 
and pervasive even, when adjusting for risk-exposures based on their three-factor and 
five-factor models. Lewellen and Nagel (2006) and Bali and Engle (2010) document 
failures of conditional and intertemporal versions of the CAPM to explain momentum. 
Carhart (1997) augments the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model with a 
momentum factor. According to Bali, Engle and Murray (2016, p. 239) the resulting 
four-factor model is the most widely used benchmark risk model in empirical asset 
pricing literature. 
2.3 Related phenomena 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) document a significant momentum effect in industry 
portfolio returns. They empirically link this phenomenon to stock-level momentum, 
by comparing industry momentum strategies, and strategies, where ‘industry’ is 
assigned to stocks at random. They find, that industry momentum strategies produce 
significant positive returns, while the random industry strategies do not, concluding 
that momentum in individual stocks is primarily driven by momentum in industries. 
Lewellen (2002) documents a similar momentum effect in portfolios sorted on market 
capitalization and book-to-market ratios. Lewellen (2002) finds that cross-sectional 
momentum between these characteristic-sorted portfolios remains significantly 
positive for up to 17 months after formation. This is in contrast with industry and 
individual stock momentum returns, which in Lewellen’s (2002) results tend to turn 
negative after 9 to 11 months. Lewellen (2002) further examines, whether momentum 
in these portfolios is present in risk-adjusted returns using the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model. He finds that returns to the factors in the three-factor model of 
Fama and French exhibit significant momentum. Furthermore, momentum in these 
factors seems to account for most of the momentum that the Fama and French 
portfolios exhibit. Industry portfolios on the other hand, generate significant and 
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persistent momentum even when strategies are formed using the residuals of the Fama 
and French three-factor model. Blitz, Huij & Martens (2011) investigate this 
relationship of the Fama and French factors using individual stocks. They report, that 
momentum strategies constructed based on idiosyncratic, stock-specific returns 
dominate ones constructed on total returns or ones based on factor exposures.  
Grundy and Martin (2001) re-examine the claims in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) 
and show that industry momentum is to a large extent dependent on returns in the most 
recent month. When considering industry momentum strategies that skip the most 
recent month, they find that the outperformance of true industry momentum to 
momentum with random industries is no longer significant. Based on these findings, 
they posit that stock-level momentum cannot entirely explain momentum in individual 
stocks. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) link both stock-level momentum and industry 
momentum to common macroeconomic factors. They show that the way industry 
momentum and individual stock momentum are related to these macroeconomic 
variables are independent of each other. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) posit that this 
finding is supportive of stock level and industry momentum being separate 
phenomena. However Griffin and Martin (2003) find no supporting evidence for the 
empirical findings Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) when looking at international 
markets. 
An extensive literature documents earnings momentum, predictability in returns based 
on past earnings. Research examining this relation include Latane and Jones (1979), 
Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996). The key 
finding in this literature is, that firms with high earnings surprises tend to outperform 
those with negative earnings surprises over subsequent periods. Studying the link 
between momentum and earnings momentum, Chan et al. (1996) find that earnings 
momentum and momentum are positively correlated but also contain complementing 
idiosyncratic information on subsequent performance. They posit that neither 
phenomenon is subsumed by the other. Contrastingly, Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) 
find that a portfolio long on highest and short on lowest earnings surprises captures 
most of the returns to a momentum strategy. 
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Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012) document time-series momentum. Time-series 
momentum differs from cross-sectional momentum in that time-series momentum 
focuses purely on an assets own recent return, instead of its return relative to other 
assets. Moskowitz et al. (2012) find time-series momentum to be pervasive across 
markets and asset classes and show that a time-series momentum factor captures 
completely the returns to traditional cross-sectional momentum. Bird, Gao and Yeung 
(2016) find evidence across 24 markets that time-series momentum is stronger than 
cross-sectional momentum. Goyal and Jegadeesh (2016) find that time-series 
momentum is present in individual US stocks as well. However, Goyal and Jegadeesh 
(2018) argue that results for time-series momentum strategies cannot be interpreted 
like cross-sectional momentum strategies. This is because, unlike cross-sectional 
momentum, time-series momentum strategies do not construct market-neutral long-
short portfolios. Instead time-series momentum takes on a time-varying net long 
position in risky assets. Goyal and Jegadeesh (2018) show that controlling for this 
time-varying long position markedly reduces returns to time-series momentum. 
2.4 Explanations for the momentum premium 
The robust evidence on momentum has generated an extensive literature of different 
theories aspiring to explain the effect. These theories can be divided into two 
competing views. Some propose rational theories, positing that momentum is 
compensation for risks that standard benchmark models do not account for. Others 
attribute momentum to cognitive biases and heuristics that affect investor behavior.  
2.4.1 Behavioral theories 
In behavioral explanations, momentum most often arises from two sources: 
underreaction and a delayed overreaction. These effects are not mutually exclusive and 
can coexist and reinforce each other to create momentum. Daniel, Hirschleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) propose a model, in which momentum arises through 
overconfidence and self-attribution bias. They model a representative investor who is 
overconfident in their own ability and attributes their successes to skill and failures to 
luck. These biases cause investors overreact to private information that they 
themselves have gathered, while underreacting to public information. Daniel et al. 
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(1998) show that momentum in their theory can arise from both underreaction to public 
information and continued overreaction to private information through positive 
autocovariances in returns. As the overreaction reverts, autocovariances turn negative, 
consistent with long-term reversals. More recently, Luo, Subrahmanyam & Titman 
(2018) provide another theory based on overconfidence. While Daniel et al. (1998) 
focus on a representative investor, Luo et al. (2018) model heterogenous investors. 
They note that their model improves upon Daniel et al. (1998) in that it predicts post-
earnings announcement drift as well. 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) provide another model based on underreaction 
by a representative investor. They suggest that conservatism, the tendency of an agent 
to insufficiently revise their beliefs based on new information, causes underreaction. 
Overreaction in turn is caused by the representativeness heuristic, which causes 
investors to mistakenly extrapolate persistent past news as representative of an 
underlying pattern. In their model, investors transition between two regimes, in which 
they either underreact or overreact to new information. The underreaction regime 
causes momentum and subsequent overreaction then exacerbates this effect, giving 
rise to reversals in the long-term. 
Hong and Stein (1999) instead model a universe with two types of investors, 
newswatchers and momentum traders. Momentum in their model arises from the 
interaction between these two groups of investors. Private information is gradually 
incorporated among the population of newswatchers, who are indifferent to past 
returns, generating underreaction to new information. The momentum traders instead 
do not incorporate new information into their trading, but instead condition purely on 
past returns. The initial underreaction makes it profitable for the momentum traders to 
trade based on past returns. Hong and Stein (1999) show, that this not only corrects 
the underreaction, but is bound to cause an eventual overreaction, as momentum 
traders continue to trade on past returns even after news is fully incorporated into 
prices.  
Antoniou, Doukas and Subrahmanyam (2013) extend on the model in Hong and Stein 
(1999) establishing a connection between investor sentiment and underreaction. They 
hypothesize that, when new information arrives that contradicts their prior sentiment, 
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the newswatchers experience cognitive dissonance resulting in a more pronounced 
underreaction. Cognitive dissonance occurs when an agent experiences discomfort 
caused by receiving information that contradicts their personal beliefs. Hong, Stein & 
Yu (2007) propose a model, where investors use oversimplified models in forming 
their opinions of stocks, ignoring some available information. This causes them to 
make persistent forecast errors, while ignoring true information, leading to an 
underreaction effect. 
Another potential source for underreaction that might cause momentum over the 
intermediate term is the disposition effect, the tendency of investors to hold on to assets 
that have lost value, while being eager to sell assets that have increased in value. 
Grinblatt and Han (2005) argue that the disposition effect causes excess selling 
pressure in stocks that have experienced positive returns recently compared to stocks 
that have experienced losses. This occurs, because investors seek to realize capital 
gains in the winner but want to hold on to the loser, causing past winners to become 
undervalued and past losers to become overvalued. Momentum then arises as prices 
gradually correct towards fundamentals. Grinblatt and Han (2005) validate their model 
empirically, by showing that a proxy of the marginal investors’ unrealized capital 
gains, constructed using return and trading volume data, predicts future returns better 
than the past return of a stock. Frazzini (2006) finds similar results using a proxy of 
unrealized capital gains, constructed from mutual fund holdings data. 
2.4.2 Rational theories 
Theories based on rational expectations argue that momentum is compensation for 
some underlying risks not accounted for by traditional asset pricing models. Berk, 
Green and Naik (1999) construct a rational model based on economic risk factors that 
facilitates both momentum and short-term reversals. Their model generates 
momentum through persistence in conditional expected returns, which results from the 
fact that the firm’s exposure to economic risk is persistent over the intermediate 
horizon. They suggest that the returns over the past 12 months is a good proxy for 
conditional expected returns because, over longer horizons, a firm’s ongoing project 
and thus economic risk exposures change. 
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 Johnson (2002) provides one rational interpretation of momentum based on the notion 
that stock prices are highly and non-linearly sensitive to firm growth rates, such that 
growth rate risk rises as growth rates become higher. All else equal, firms with high 
realized recent returns are more likely to have experienced increases in growth rates 
and thus more risk related to growth rates. If one assumes that investors need to be 
compensated for taking on this additional risk, future expected returns need to increase 
respectively, generating a momentum effect. Sagi and Seasholes (2007) provide a 
similar risk-based model. In their model, a firm can have growth options and limited 
liability options. Growth options are assets that increase in value, when the firm has 
performed well, while limited liability options reduce risk and expected returns, when 
the firm performs poorly. These options contribute positively to return autocovariance 
and the positive return autocovariance in turn gives rise to momentum. 
Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002) propose a theory of rational investors with 
asymmetric information. In their model news arrive discretely, agents speculate on 
upcoming news and some agents become informed of the content of the news later 
than others. Uncertainty about these news gives rise to risk premia, which decrease 
gradually as more and more agents become informed about upcoming news. Vayanos 
and Woolley (2013) suggest a rational model of momentum and long-term reversals 
based on fund flows. They propose, that investors update their knowledge of a fund 
manager’s efficiency through realized returns or directly. Momentum arises when 
outflows by rational investors cause the fund to have to liquidate part of their assets, 
causing a further negative shock to prices of the assets that experienced recent negative 
shocks. Luo (2012) posts empirical evidence consistent with this model. 
2.4.3 Factor explanations 
A related body of empirical work links momentum returns to different types of cross-
sectional and macroeconomic factors. It is worth noting here, that there is nothing 
special about a factor explanation that would preclude a behavioral explanation (see 
e.g. Kozak, Nagel & Santosh (2018) for a recent discussion). However, most of these 
factors do build on the premise of rational investors and risk.  
21 
Liu and Zhang (2008) show that a little more than half of momentum returns can be 
explained by a priced macroeconomic risk factor constructed based on the growth rate 
of industrial production. Their work is motivated by the theoretical work of Johnson 
(2002) and Sagi and Seasholes (2007). They find that past winners temporarily 
experience temporary higher exposures on the growth rate of industrial production 
than losers. These loadings then tend to reverse to a degree after a few months. 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) show that most of momentum returns can be 
explained by systematic exposures to a set of macroeconomic factors that are known 
to predict future market returns. While they do not explicitly provide a rational 
explanation, they conclude that future behavioral theories should seek to reconcile 
these empirically shown links to the macroeconomy. Griffin and Martin (2003) look 
for this relationship between momentum and macroeconomic variables around 
international markets and find that the conditional model of Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002) does not explain momentum returns outside the US. 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) find that about half of the returns to a momentum 
strategy can be explained by exposure to liquidity risk. Sadka (2006) decomposes 
liquidity risk into variable and fixed components and shows that the unexpected 
systematic variations in liquidity risk explain 40% to 80% of the returns to a 
momentum portfolio. Recently, Ruenzi and Weigert (2018) show that momentum has 
a significant positive loading on a crash sensitivity factor introduced by Chabi-Yo, 
Ruenzi and Weigert (2018). The factor captures investors’ aversion to stocks that have 
large conditional betas during market crashes. They find that momentum does not 
generate significant positive returns after controlling for crash sensitivity risk. 
Ahn, Conrad and Dittmar (2003) explore a stochastic discount factor approach that is 
not conditional on a particular asset pricing model being true and allows for time-
varying risk premiums. They find that around half of the returns to momentum are 
explained by their model, concluding that momentum does not seem to be entirely 
consistent with rational pricing. Fong, Wong and Lean (2005) also conduct tests that 
are independent of any particular benchmark model. They employ a stochastical 
dominance approach to test whether a general asset pricing model can explain 
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momentum when investors are risk-averse. Like Ahn et. al (2003), they find evidence 
that is difficult to reconcile with rational models.  
Hou, Xue & Zhang (2014) show, that their four-factor model with market, size, 
investment and profitability factors explain most of momentum returns. They 
emphasize that their model does not take a stance between risk-based and behavioral 
interpretations. Kelly, Moskowitz and Pruitt (2018) find that the predictive power of 
momentum is subsumed by a conditional factor model that aggregates return 
predictability from a broad range of firm characteristics known to predict returns. 
Kelly, Moskowitz and Pruitt (2018) posit that their factors are to be interpreted as 
compensation for risk. Stambaugh and Yu (2017) build on a similar premise of 
combining multiple characteristics into a factor model, but with a behavioral 
interpretation. They find that their model similarly subsumes momentum. It is worth 
noting that both Kelly, Moskowitz & Pruitt (2018) and Stambaugh and Yu (2017) 
include momentum itself in their set of characteristics. 
2.5 Determinants of momentum returns 
An extensive literature focuses on identifying predictable determinants of momentum 
returns. An extensive portion of this literature is interested in different characteristics 
of stocks and returns that might result in differing degrees of momentum profits. This 
literature is of interest in the discourse over different theories of momentum, as 
connections between momentum and firm-specific characteristics can shed light on 
how momentum arises. In addition, identifying both time-series and cross-sectional 
determinants of momentum returns is interesting from an investment perspective. If an 
investor can observe firm-specific or market-wide variables, that command higher 
momentum returns ex-ante, they can potentially utilize this information to improve the 
profitability of a momentum strategy. In this section, I cover he literature on cross-
sectional and time-series determinants of momentum and limits to arbitraging 
momentum. Although I briefly cover some investment perspectives, my main focus is 
on the implications of results in terms of theories on momentum. 
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2.5.1 Cross-sectional determinants of momentum 
First, I cover literature considering different firm and return characteristics that 
command higher or lower momentum profits. The key idea here is that different 
theories of momentum imply, directly or indirectly, that momentum should be stronger 
among certain types of stocks. 
Da, Gurun & Warachka (2014) test an underreaction theory of momentum. Using daily 
returns, they show that momentum is much stronger among stocks where formation 
period returns accumulate more gradually. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) find 
similar evidence using monthly returns to measure the consistency of returns instead. 
There are a few different interpretations for these findings. Da et al. (2014) hypothesize 
that investors are inattentive to news that arrive gradually, while Grinblatt and Han 
(2005) argue that these results are consistent with their model based on the disposition 
effect, because consistent winners are likely to have larger unrealized capital gains. 
Another potential explanation is the gradual diffusion of private information among 
investors, consistent with both a behavioral explanation (Hong and Stein, 1999) and a 
rational interpretation based on information asymmetry (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 
2002). 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) show that returns to momentum profits are markedly 
stronger in low-market capitalization stocks and, after controlling for market 
capitalization, among stocks with low analyst coverage. They interpret these findings 
as evidence supporting an underreaction theory of momentum. However, they could 
just as well be indicative of the information asymmetry and rational investors, as 
suggested by Holden Subrahmanyam (2002). Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) 
similarly find stronger momentum among low market capitalization stocks. However, 
Israel and Moskowitz (2013) show that the size effect found by Hong et al. (2000) and 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) is unique to the period between 1980 and 1996. 
Hvidkjaer (2006) examines investor behavior by comparing trading volume initiated 
by buyers and sellers. He finds that small traders exhibit a strong underreaction effect 
followed by overreaction. Furthermore, he finds that the actions of small traders during 
the portfolio formation period significantly affect the profitability of momentum. He 
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concludes that momentum could be driven by the behavior of these small traders, 
consistent with a behavioral explanation. Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) hypothesize 
that investors in countries with high degree of individualism are more likely to be 
subject to the biases that behavioral theories attribute momentum to. Exploring the link 
between the degree of individualism and momentum returns across countries, they find 
that momentum is stronger in countries with high degree of individualism. They 
conclude that their evidence favors a behavioral interpretation of momentum. 
Daniel and Titman (1999) hypothesize that mispricing caused by investor 
overconfidence should be stronger in stocks, whose valuation relies on more subjective 
information, such as growth stocks. They find that momentum returns are significantly 
stronger among stocks with low book-to-market ratios than stocks with high book-to-
market ratios. They argue that this finding is in line with momentum caused by investor 
overconfidence. Sagi and Seasholes (2007) show that momentum is considerably 
higher among firms with high volatility in revenue growth and low cost of goods sold. 
They also find evidence of the book-to-market effect, initially documented by Daniel 
and Titman (1999). However, Sagi and Seasholes (2007) interpret their findings based 
on a model with rational investors instead. 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find, that momentum is stronger among stocks with high 
trading volume. Furthermore, they find that strongest momentum returns are generated 
by strategies that go long on low-volume winners and short on high-volume losers. 
Hong and Stein (2007) note that the Hong and Stein (1999) model incorporating both 
under- and overreaction is consistent with higher momentum returns among stocks 
with higher trading volume.  
A related finding is documented by Arena, Haggard & Yan (2008), who find that 
momentum is significantly stronger among stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility. 
They deem their findings supportive of a behavioral explanation. They base this 
interpretation on the intuition that returns to stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility 
have more firm-specific information and thus exhibit stronger under- or overreaction. 
However, Vayanos and Woolley (2013) in fact provide a rational model that predicts 
this relationship between momentum and idiosyncratic risk. Avramov, Chordia, 
Jostova and Philipov (2013) document a related finding that credit risk plays a key role 
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in explaining momentum. They find that, when excluding the companies with the 
worst credit ratings, momentum returns become statistically insignificant and 
economically small.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) find that momentum strategies earn positive returns over 
the first 12 months following portfolio formation, but that these returns revert to a 
degree over the 13 to 60 months following portfolio formation. Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) show that these reversals occur faster for high volume winners and low volume 
losers. Both Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) argue that 
their findings support an overreaction story. However, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
advise caution in interpreting their results, because they are sensitive to 
methodological choices.  Looking at both momentum and earnings momentum, Chan, 
Jegadeesh & Lakonishok (1996) find only very weak evidence of reversals in 
momentum returns and no evidence of reversals in earnings momentum. Conrad and 
Yavuz (2017) provide evidence that contest earlier findings of reversals. They show 
that the stocks, which contribute positively to momentum are in fact less likely to 
exhibit reversals. They find that these return reversals are driven by stocks that do not 
contribute to momentum returns. Furthermore, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) argue 
that momentum and long-term reversals are at least partly unrelated, because long-
term reversals and momentum exhibit quite different seasonal patterns. These findings 
seem to indicate that the ability to explain long-term reversals is not a particularly 
important prerequisite for a model of momentum. 
Two recent papers study the term structure of momentum returns. Novy-Marx (2012) 
finds that momentum in U.S. stock returns is driven by returns over 12 to 7 months 
prior to portfolio formation. Momentum portfolios in the U.S. stock market, formed 
by using returns over the prior 6 to 2 months, significantly underperform portfolios 
formed on returns over the past 12 to 7 months. He argues that this echo-like term 
structure of momentum presents a challenge for theories, as most suggested models of 
momentum, both behavioral and rational, fail to deliver this type of a term structure. 
However, Goyal and Wahal (2015) argue that this underperformance is largely driven 
by a spillover of short-term reversals to month 2 prior to portfolio formation. Looking 
at international evidence, they find that this discrepancy between momentum 
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portfolios formed on months -2 to -6 and month -7 to -12, is very small or non-existent, 
or even reversed in major stock markets outside the U.S. 
2.5.2 Momentum over time and the market cycle 
Another branch of the literature documents predictability in momentum returns over 
time. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that momentum returns exhibit a very specific 
and strong seasonal pattern. They find that momentum has economically large and 
statistically significant negative returns in Januaries. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
confirm that this phenomenon persist also in the nine years following the Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) sample period. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) hypothesize that 
tax-loss selling causes these seasonality effects. Consistent with this prediction, they 
show that these seasonal patterns are stronger among stocks that are most likely held 
by taxable investors and in high tax years. Grinblatt and Han (2005) show that their 
behavioral model of momentum can explain the December and January effects, when 
tax-loss selling causes negative drift in investors’ demand. Sias (2007) finds that 
momentum returns are stronger in quarter-ending months and particularly in 
Decembers. Sias (2007) links these results empirically to both window dressing by 
institutional investors and tax-loss selling by investors. 
Many papers document the pro-cyclical nature of momentum. Cooper, Gutierrez & 
Hameed (2004) find that momentum returns are positive only in up markets and 
negative in down markets. They attribute their finding to increased overreaction, 
stemming from an increase in investor overconfidence after positive market outcomes. 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) document the same phenomenon but propose a risk-
based interpretation. Sagi and Seasholes (2007) show that their rational model 
generates this pro-cyclicality as well. Antoniou, Doukas and Subrahmanyam (2013) 
argue for a behavioral interpretation and show that investor sentiment has incremental 
value in explaining momentum returns on top of market returns. Stivers and Sun 
(2010) explore cross-sectional return dispersion as a state variable and find that 
momentum returns are lower following high cross-sectional return dispersion and vice 
versa. They further show that the explanatory value of past market returns is subsumed 
by the explanatory value of return dispersion.  
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Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) examine crashes in momentum returns. They find that 
momentum strategies experience occasional large negative returns commonly 
occurring after the stock market recovers from downturns, because momentum tends 
to have a large negative conditional market beta during these times. Earlier work by 
Grundy and Martin (2001) documents this market state dependent beta of momentum 
as well. The cyclicality in momentum returns found in earlier studies is potentially 
explained by these occasional crashes, although Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) do not 
directly investigate this. Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) explore potential explanations 
for their findings based on risk but find no explanation that can fully account for their 
results. They conclude that their findings could be consistent with either a behavioral 
or a rational explanation. The findings of Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) are in conflict 
with the findings of Ruenzi and Weigert (2018), who show that exposure to a risk 
factor based on investors’ aversion to tail risk explains most of momentum profits. 
Because momentum in fact takes on short positions in stocks that are sensitive to 
negative tail-events, it seems counterintuitive that momentum would be compensation 
for holding tail-risk sensitive assets. 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) examine this tail-risk of momentum strategies and 
suggest an improved momentum strategy that scales its long-short position based on 
the realized volatility of momentum returns. They find that this adjustment almost 
doubles the Sharpe ratio of momentum. Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) show that taking 
market state into account further improves upon the volatility-managed momentum 
strategies suggested by Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015). 
2.5.3 Momentum and limits to arbitrage 
Because momentum is a widely documented phenomenon, there needs to exist some 
reason why momentum returns continue to persist. If momentum returns are reward 
for some form of risk taken on by momentum investors, then this reconciliation is 
straightforward. However, if momentum is caused by behavioral biases, then rational 
investors can take advantage of these biases by employing momentum strategies. As 
more rational investors engage in harvesting momentum returns, momentum should 
attenuate. If momentum is to persist, investors need to remain irrational despite being 
aware of momentum existing. This bias needs to be either widespread or large in 
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magnitude in order to exceed the extent, to which rational arbitrageurs are able to take 
advantage of momentum returns. The ability of rational arbitrageurs to take advantage 
of momentum is limited by trading costs and other limits to arbitrage. 
Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) estimate the trading costs related to momentum, 
using various methods suggested in the literature. They find that momentum strategies 
have high turnover, and the stocks driving momentum tend to have high transaction 
costs. Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) document similar results, estimated with 
alternative measures. Frazzini, Israel and Moskowitz (2012), however, argue that 
preceding literature exaggerates true trading costs that a large institutional investor 
might face. Using data of realized transaction costs including price impact, incurred 
by a large asset management firm, they show that true realized transaction costs are 
around a tenth of the costs suggested by previous literature. They find that momentum 
is robust to these trading costs and can be implemented on a very large scale. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Pontiff (2006) identify idiosyncratic volatility as an 
important factor limiting arbitrage. McLean (2010) focuses on the arbitrage limiting 
aspect of idiosyncratic volatility and finds no significant relationship between 
idiosyncratic volatility and momentum. He suggests that arbitraging momentum is 
limited by high transaction costs instead. The findings of McLean (2010) contradict 
those of Arena, Haggard & Yan (2008). The key difference between the two papers is 
in their methodological approach. McLean (2010) emphasizes the limits to arbitrage –
aspect of idiosyncratic volatility and examines portfolio selection by a risk-averse 
investor, while Arena et al. (2008) study the magnitude of momentum returns across 
terciles of idiosyncratic volatility. 
2.6 Momentum and return autocovariance 
The set of explanations offered for the momentum premium is large. Subrahmanyam 
(2018) calls for more research seeking to separate between the theories. However, the 
literature discussed in subsections 2.3-2.4 demonstrates the difficulty of this task. 
Models of momentum generate a variety of testable predictions and empirical evidence 
exists in support of many different interpretations. One important question to assess 
when evaluating different theories is what return mechanisms drive momentum. Lo 
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and MacKinlay (1990) show that returns to strategies based on past returns can be 
decomposed three different sources of returns: return autocovariances, return cross-
covariances and cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected returns. Lewellen 
(2002) provides a thorough description of how these different return drivers are related 
to theories on momentum. He also submits empirical evidence that is difficult for most 
models in the literature to reconcile. 
Throughout the remainder of the thesis, I refer to return autocovariances and cross-
covariances. Many papers on decomposing momentum elect to use return 
autocorrelation and cross-correlation instead. In terms of theories on momentum, we 
are most interested in the sign and significance of the time-series dependence, in which 
case correlation and covariance can be used interchangeably. My choice of using 
autocovariances and cross-covariances is motivated by the fact that computing the 
decomposition in terms of return autocovariances and cross-covariances allows us to 
directly interpret decomposition estimates as the investment return generated by each 
return mechanism. 
2.6.1 The decomposition and theories on momentum 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) examine strategies that weight assets relative to their past 
returns compared to an equally-weighted index of all assets. They analytically solve 
for the expected returns to such a strategy and uncover three distinct components. 5 In 
the context of momentum these different components can be interpreted as follows. 
First, stock returns might exhibit positive autocovariances, such that a stock’s past 
return positively predicts returns in following periods. Second, stock returns might 
exhibit negative cross-covariances. This means that a high return on one stock might 
negatively predict subsequent returns on some other stocks. Third, some stocks might 
simply have higher unconditional expected returns than others. A momentum strategy 
on average invests long into assets with higher expected returns and short into assets 
                                                 
5 The decomposition is discussed in more detail in Section 4, when I present my data and methodology.  
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with low expected returns. If the dispersion in unconditional expected returns is high 
enough, this gives rise to momentum returns.6  
Lewellen (2002) shows how these three return drivers are linked to models of returns 
under which momentum can arise. The first model considered by Lewellen (2002) 
assumes that prices follow a random walk, with auto- and cross-covariances being 
zero. In this case momentum returns are solely based on the cross-sectional variance 
in expected returns, and the realized past return i.e. momentum measure only provides 
a very noisy proxy of the unconditional expected return. In terms of theories, 
momentum arising from differences in unconditional expected returns would be the 
easiest to reconcile based on rational pricing. The intuition would be that some firms 
have higher unconditional returns on average and consistently end up as winners, 
because these firms are perceived as riskier for some reason or another. This is of 
course not to say that cross-sectional variation in expected returns driving momentum 
would completely exclude behavioral theories either. Investors might irrationally 
prefer holding some types of stocks over others, causing consistent differences in 
returns. 
A common interpretation of momentum is that it is a result of investors underreacting 
to new information. Lewellen (2002) formally shows that when prices do not 
completely accommodate new information, return volatility decreases and returns 
become positively autocorrelated. Linking this result back to the Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990) decomposition, he shows that underreaction leads to momentum. This 
mechanism illustrated by Lewellen (2002) is in alignment with most of the behavioral 
underreaction theories suggested in the literature. 
Lewellen (2002) also illustrates a less common interpretation that momentum arises 
from negative cross-covariances among stocks. He presents two models under which 
cross-covariances might explain momentum. The first one is a behavioral model 
                                                 
6 Lo and MacKinlay (1990) are interested in short-term contrarian strategies, but their decomposition 
applies for all past return strategies, including momentum. More precisely, contrarian strategies assign 
negative (positive) weights to assets with positive past returns. The interpretation changes in that for 
contrarian strategies negative autocovariances contribute positively, positive cross-covariances 
contribute positively and unconditional expected returns always contribute negatively. 
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related to overreaction where investors receive news about one firm and overestimate 
the effect of these news on other firms. Lewellen (2002) shows that such a model 
induces positive covariances in contemporaneous returns, but negative auto- and cross-
covariances. Linking this back to the momentum decomposition, momentum returns 
are positive, if the negative cross-covariances dominate the negative autocovariances, 
which work against momentum. Lewellen (2002) shows that a simple restriction, that 
positive news on one firm have a positive but smaller effect on other stocks, results in 
positive momentum returns.  
Lewellen (2002) shows that momentum from negative cross-covariances can 
alternatively be a result of time-varying risk premiums, when price changes are driven 
by both changes in risk premiums and cash flows. He shows that positive momentum 
profits arise when stocks, whose prices are sensitive to changes in risk premiums, also 
have cash flows with low sensitivity to changes in risk premiums and vice versa. This 
setting can arise, for example, because of shorter (longer) durations in the cash flows 
of stocks that are sensitive (insensitive) to business conditions. Lewellen (2002) notes 
that, since both overreaction and time-varying risk premiums generate similar patterns 
in the Lo and MacKinlay (1990) decomposition, distinction between these two models, 
where momentum is generated by negative cross-covariances, is difficult.  
Lewellen (2002) illustrates these models as only some examples of the potential 
mechanisms driving momentum. The intuition in Lewellen (2002) seems to be, 
however, that positive autocovariances would be most consistent with an 
underreaction theory of momentum. In contrast to this, many of the rational models 
suggested in the literature, in fact, imply positive return autocovariances. For example, 
Johnson (2002), Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Sagi and Seasholes (2007) all 
present a risk-based theory for momentum that is entirely consistent with positive 
return autocovariances. Similarly, most overreaction theories presented in the 
literature imply positive autocovariances that later turn into negative ones, instead of 
the kind of overreaction suggested by Lewellen (2002) above. Exploring the literature, 
I find no well-known theory of momentum that suggests negative cross-covariances, 
rational or behavioral. Furthermore, many risk-based explanations for momentum 
explore time-varying, conditional expected returns instead of unconditional expected 
returns (Berk, Green & Naik, 1999, Chordia & Shivakumar, 2002 and Kelly, 
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Moskowitz & Pruitt 2018). It is difficult to infer how momentum arising in a 
conditional setting would manifest itself in terms of the unconditional decomposition. 
This is not to say that the Lo and MacKinlay (1990) decomposition is not useful in 
distinguishing between theories. It still provides a solid framework for disentangling 
the drivers of momentum returns. The most important insight of the decomposition is 
that momentum is not necessarily driven by positive autocovariances. Return 
autocovariance is a time-series attribute of an individual stock, while cross-sectional 
momentum is about relative returns between stocks. However, most theories seem to 
view evidence of cross-sectional momentum as evidence of positive autocovariance in 
returns and attempt to explain it as such. Now, if positive autocovariance is a 
prerequisite for a model, we intuitively should reject the model if we find that 
momentum is not driven by positive autocovariances. Instead, we should then pursue 
to establish models where momentum arises from one or both of the remaining drivers 
of momentum.  
2.6.2 Empirical evidence on the decomposition of momentum 
Having introduced the theoretical framework, I now summarize the empirical findings 
in the literature that builds upon the decomposition by Lo and MacKinlay (1990). At 
this point, it is worth noting that a slightly problematic facet of this branch of research 
is the inconsistency of the strategies employed. Some papers study momentum in 
individual stocks, others interpret portfolio-level momentum to be representative of 
both effects, based on Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) and Lewellen (2002).  
Furthermore, the choice of formation and holding period lengths varies a lot between 
the papers. 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) decompose the returns to momentum strategies on individual 
stocks. They construct similar relative weighting strategies and utilize the Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990) framework. However, their decomposition diverges slightly from 
the one presented above. Conrad and Kaul (1998) only consider autocovariances and 
cross-covariances through their joint contribution to the returns of a momentum 
strategy and do not disentangle the effects of firm-specific return autocovariance and 
cross-covariance. They find that, for momentum strategies formed based on past 12 
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month returns (not skipping the latest month), the time-series predictability component 
contributes negatively with high statistical significance, while cross-sectional variation 
in unconditional expected returns is very large and positive, resulting in positive and 
statistically significant momentum returns. Their findings are similar for momentum 
strategies formed on 3 to 9 months of past returns and consistent across time. Conrad 
and Kaul (1998) further validate their results based on bootstrap simulations. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) discuss Conrad and Kaul’s (1998) findings and show 
that momentum returns tend to revert over time, which is inconsistent with momentum 
arising from variation in unconditional expected returns. This finding of reversals in 
momentum returns, however, has been later contested by Conrad and Yavuz (2017).  
A more important shortcoming of Conrad and Kaul (1998) is pointed out by Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2002). They show that estimates of cross-sectional variance in 
unconditional expected returns pick up not only the variance in true unconditional 
expected returns but also the variance generated by estimation error. This leads to 
exaggerated estimates of cross-sectional variances in returns, which is further 
exacerbated by the fact that Conrad and Kaul (1998) include stocks with short return 
histories in their sample. They also show that Conrad and Kaul’s (1998) bootstrap 
results suffer from the same small-sample bias than the estimates. This is because their 
method of sampling with replacement causes extreme returns to contribute heavily to 
momentum returns. 
Park and Kim (2014) replicate the decomposition used by Conrad and Kaul (1998) in 
14 different markets. They find, that momentum returns are overwhelmingly driven by 
variation in unconditional expected returns, while the contribution of the time-series 
components is in general negative. Park and Kim (2014), however, do not describe 
their estimations of the components in detail and do not comment on the critique 
presented in response to Conrad and Kaul (1998). The problems highlighted by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) can only be exacerbated by the fact that Park and Kim 
(2014) study markets with shorter return histories and fewer stocks. 
Bulkley and Nawosah (2009) suggest another test of whether unconditional expected 
returns can explain momentum. They argue that if momentum arises from variation in 
unconditional expected returns, then momentum should not be present when firm-
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specific unconditional expected return is deducted from returns. Bulkley and Nawosah 
(2009) use lifetime mean return of a stock as a proxy for the unconditional expected 
return and find no momentum in demeaned returns. Bhootra (2011) shows that the 
results in Bulkley and Nawosah (2009) can, to an extent, be attributed to their inclusion 
of penny stocks and the fact that they elect to not skip the latest month in portfolio 
formation. According to Bhootra (2011), controlling for these methodological oddities 
makes momentum robust in demeaned returns as well. Still, returns to momentum 
based on demeaned returns are markedly lower than for regular momentum. The more 
significant shortcoming of Bulkley and Nawosah (2009) is the fact that they use all of 
the return observations for each asset to form their estimates of unconditional expected 
returns, resulting in a similar bias as in Conrad and Kaul (1998). Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2002) show that momentum strategies are equally, if not more, profitable when 
implemented on abnormal returns. Abnormal returns here refer to returns calculated 
as the returns over the formation period adjusted for an out-of-sample estimate of the 
unconditional expected return. 
Lewellen (2002) studies the full decomposition of momentum returns in industry 
portfolios and Fama and French size and book-to-market sorted portfolios. He 
considers relative weighting strategies that are formed based on 12-month returns and 
held for  one month with zero to 17 months skipped between the formation period and 
the holding period. The results Lewellen (2002) documents are striking. He finds that, 
across the 18 lags, both auto- and cross-covariances in returns are mostly negative. 
These results are consistent across size-sorted portfolios, book-to-market–sorted 
portfolios and industry portfolios with around half of the negative estimates being 
statistically significant. Lewellen (2002) posits based on his results, that momentum 
must be driven by return cross-covariances. 
Pan, Liano and Huang (2004) focus on similar strategies but using weekly returns. 
They argue that the resulting larger sample size allows for more powerful tests. Pan et 
al. (2004) look at return autocovariances of 20 industry portfolios using weekly returns 
at lags of 1 to 26 weeks. They find positive autocovariances on short horizons, which 
gradually decrease and turn into negative ones at horizons longer than 12 weeks. The 
autocovariances at longer lags are much smaller in magnitude. Turning to the 
momentum strategies, Pan et al. (2004) form relative weighting strategies based on 
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one-week returns at varying lags and held for one week.  They find that momentum is 
very strong and significant on short horizons, but strategies formed on returns in the 
past 12-26 weeks generate no returns. Decomposing the returns, they find that positive 
autocovariances drive this momentum effect, cross-covariances contribute 
significantly negatively and the unconditional expected returns have a very small but 
statistically significant positive contribution. These findings are in stark contrast to 
Lewellen’s (2002) findings on monthly returns. Differences are to be expected due to 
the major deviations between the methodologies in the two papers. Because weekly 
returns are very noisy, it is unlikely that there is enough signal relative to noise at lags 
longer than a few weeks to form a meaningful investment strategy. Moreover, it is well 
known that individual stock returns exhibit reversals at shorter horizons, so it is 
unlikely that these positive autocovariances at short horizons in portfolios are 
meaningful in terms of explaining momentum in individual stocks. 
Moskowitz, Ooi, Pedersen (2012) find that positive autocovariances drive momentum 
in equity indices, commodities, government bonds and currencies. Furthermore, they 
find that time-series momentum is stronger than cross-sectional momentum in these 
asset classes. Moskowitz et al. (2012) argue that returns to time-series momentum are 
higher, because time-series momentum only picks up return autocovariances, which 
seem to contribute positively to momentum, and ignores cross-covariances that 
contribute negatively. Goyal and Jegadeesh (2018), however, note that the better 
performance of time-series momentum strategies is due to a time-varying net long 
position in the equal-weighted market index that the time-series momentum strategy 
takes on. Thus, they argue that returns to time-series momentum are not directly 
comparable to cross-sectional momentum, which is a zero net investment strategy. 
Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002) study autocovariances of decile portfolios sorted 
by market capitalization and past return over the last 3-months, to study their 
information asymmetry theory for momentum. They find positive autocovariances 
among all past return deciles and all size deciles except for the largest decile of stocks. 
The positive autocovariances are statistically significant in the 5 smallest deciles of 
market capitalization and in 8 out of the ten past return deciles.  Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (2002) argue that the short 3-month horizon is most relevant to their 
study, because their model is focused on earnings announcements and similar news, 
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which are released quarterly. They mention that using a return horizon of 6 and 12 
months yields similar but weaker results. Exact results are, however, left unreported. 
Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002) do not relate their findings to other literature or 
directly to the decomposition of momentum returns. 
Pan (2010) constructs momentum strategies on industry and characteristic-sorted 
portfolios, following Lewellen (2002). Using formation and holding periods of equal 
length and varying from 3 to 12 months, they find evidence supporting cross-
covariances as the key driver of momentum, similar to Lewellen (2002). However, Pan 
(2010) argues that since the relevant return horizon in Lo and MacKinlay (1990) is 
fixed, the decomposition fails to capture positive autocovariances at shorter horizons, 
which is the type of autocovariances predicted by behavioral models. To analyze this 
intuition empirically, Pan (2010) examines monthly autocovariances across 12 lags. 
He finds that the average and cumulative autocovariances are positive across all 
industry and characteristic-sorted portfolios over a 6-month horizon and positive for 
most portfolios over a 12-month horizon. Based on this, Pan (2010) concludes that 
returns exhibit the kind of positive autocovariance that is consistent with most 
underreaction theories. However, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) decomposition is a 
mathematical identity that unambiguously defines the relevant return horizon for 
return autocovariance. Pan (2010) does not discuss any mechanism that would cause 
a discrepancy between the relevant horizon for momentum and return autocovariance. 
Chen and Hong (2002) show that the Lo and MacKinlay (1990) can yield inaccurate 
results when returns follow a common factor structure and the factor itself exhibits 
autocovariance. To account for this shortcoming of the decomposition, Chen and Hong 
(2002) present an alternative decomposition following Jegadeesh and Titman (1995). 
This decomposition relies on the assumption that returns follow a common factor 
structure with constant exposures to contemporaneous and lagged realizations of the 
common factor. They study momentum in industry portfolios, using 6-month 
formation and holding periods, with no months skipped in between. They find that, in 
this alternative decomposition, positive return autocovariances show up as the 
dominant determinant of momentum returns, being responsible for around 80% of the 
momentum returns in their full sample from 1928 to 1999. The overreaction 
component, consisting of the contemporaneous and lagged factor exposures, 
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contributes positively but account for less than 20% of the momentum returns in the 
full sample. Finally, Chen and Hong (2002) find that the contribution of variation in 
unconditional expected returns is only around 5% of the total returns. 
Du (2012) employs a regression-based methodology, proposed by Du and Watkins 
(2007), that allows for decomposing momentum returns into all three components in 
individual stocks. The strategies he employs are portfolio-based momentum strategies, 
with one-month and 6-month formation period and a 6-month holding period. His 
results are somewhat similar to the findings of Lewellen (2002). He finds that over 
both horizons considered, firm-specific autocovariances contribute negatively and 
statistically significantly to momentum returns. He also finds that variation in 
unconditional expected returns and negative cross-autocovariances contribute about 
equally to the 1-month strategy. For the 6-month formation period, variation in 
unconditional expected returns arises as the most important component. 
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3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
LITERATURE 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) decompose returns to past return strategies and show, that 
returns to a momentum strategy can be caused by either positive return 
autocovariances, negative return cross-covariances or by cross-sectional variation in 
unconditional expected returns. In subsection 2.4, I cover a large body of theoretical 
literature suggesting varying interpretations of the momentum anomaly, including 
both rational and behavioral interpretations.  In subsection 2.6, I discuss, how 
understanding the return mechanism behind momentum is important in distinguishing 
between these theories. All behavioral, and some rational theories on momentum 
imply that momentum is driven by positive autocovariances in returns. Some rational 
theories suggest that momentum is caused by cross-sectional variation in 
unconditional expected returns. Lewellen (2002) suggests both a rational and a 
behavioral interpretation of momentum, when momentum is driven by negative cross-
covariances among stocks. However, prior empirical evidence on which of these return 
mechanisms are important in explaining momentum is inconsistent. Empirical 
evidence in support of all three return mechanisms has been posted in the literature.  
To summarize, we have many competing theories on momentum but inconclusive 
empirical evidence on the return mechanism behind momentum. In my empirical 
analysis, I add to this branch literature on decomposing momentum strategies. 
Explicitly stated, I focus on the research question: Is momentum driven by positive 
return autocovariances, negative cross-covariances or cross-sectional variation in 
unconditional expected returns? For each of these three return mechanisms, I 
separately test for the hypothesis that the component positively contributes to the 
returns on momentum strategies. 
I contribute to prior literature by examining the decomposition in both individual 
stocks and portfolios of stocks. Prior work on individual stocks focuses on the role of 
unconditional expected returns and does not separate between autocovariances and 
cross-covariances. On the other hand, prior research that does disentangle 
autocovariances from cross-covariances focuses on portfolios of stocks instead of 
individual stocks. Examining momentum in individual stocks and portfolios separately 
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is important because momentum in portfolios of stocks and momentum in individual 
stocks might be somewhat separate phenomena. For example, Grundy and Martin 
(2001), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Blitz, Huij & Martens (2011) present 
evidence that momentum in stock portfolios and momentum in individual stocks are 
somewhat distinct phenomena. Furthermore, return auto- and cross-covariances can 
behave differently for individual stocks and portfolios of stocks. For example, 
Demiguel, Nogales & Uppal (2014) find that, in daily returns, first-order 
autocovariances and cross-covariances are negative for individual stocks while they 
are positive for portfolios of stocks. Motivated by this prior literature, I seek to answer 
a secondary research question: Do the three return drivers contribute differently to 
momentum in individual stocks and to momentum in portfolios of stocks? 
There are likely two reasons why prior literature focuses on portfolios of stocks instead 
of individual stocks. First, estimation is challenging for individual stocks, because of 
unbalanced panels of return histories. The second problem with using individual stocks 
is that samples of individual stocks include extreme return observations and short 
return histories. This causes extreme return observations to disproportionately 
contribute to sample estimates of autocovariances, cross-covariances and 
unconditional expected returns, resulting in biases in the decomposition.  
I suggest two complementing methodologies that allow me to fully decompose the 
returns for both individual stocks and at the portfolio level. The first one involves 
conducting the decomposition in a moving window, using pairwise return histories. 
This enables me to estimate cross-covariance matrices for individual stocks in the 
presence of unbalanced panels. The second method I suggest is a strategy-based 
decomposition, novel to the literature. I analytically decompose the momentum 
strategy into three separate strategies that take advantage of autocovariances, cross-
covariances and unconditional expected returns respectively. This allows me to restate 
the question of which return mechanism drives momentum as: which return 
mechanisms can an investor take advantage of in real time? Because the strategy-based 
decomposition does not require estimating cross-covariance matrices, it does not 
restrict the universe of stocks to those with pairwise return histories. 
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Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) demonstrate, that estimates of the variation of 
unconditional expected returns are positively biased for individual stocks. Statistical 
literature (Chan, 1992, Chan, 1995 and Deutsch, Richards & Swain, 1990) documents 
the sensitivity of sample estimates of autocovariances and cross-covariances to outlier 
observations. My third main research question is motivated by this literature and the 
inconsistency of prior evidence on decomposing momentum returns. My third 
question, explicitly stated is: Do sample estimates of the contributions of the different 
return mechanisms, used in prior literature suffer from biases? To test for these biases, 
I replicate a bootstrap experiment, used by Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) to study 
individual stocks, and extend their evidence to portfolio data. I utilize the same 
bootstrap setting and make a novel contribution to the literature by showing that 
sample estimates of the contribution of return autocovariances are negatively biased 
and sample estimates of the contribution of cross-covariances are positively biased. 
These biases likely contribute to the inconsistencies in prior empirical evidence. 
I tackle these biases in the decomposition in two ways. I provide an initial examination 
by estimating the decomposition using winsorized returns, pulling in the extreme 
returns. My main method of adjusting for the biases is the strategy-based 
decomposition. The strategy-based decomposition gives a natural interpretation to 
these biases as forward-looking biases. Using only information available to the 
investor ex-ante to form these strategies results in unbiased estimates of the 
decomposition. I show that both methods of controlling for these biases result in 
positive autocovariances appearing as the key driver of momentum returns. 
I further contribute to the literature by examining, how these contributions evolve over 
time. Prior literature generally assumes, that the contributions of autocovariances, 
cross-covariances and cross-sectional variances in unconditional expected returns 
remain consistent throughout the sample period. Another advantage of the strategy-
based decomposition is that it naturally allows for time-variance in the contributions. 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) show that the accuracy of their decomposition does not rely 
on the assumption of stationarity and that estimates of each contribution can be 
interpreted as the average contributions. However, the return mechanisms behind 
momentum may change over time, which is quite relevant with regards to theories on 
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momentum. The time-evolution of these components also sheds some light on the 
potential profitability of momentum in the future. 
My final contribution to the literature is to extend the sample period under study. Prior 
literature on the decomposition mostly dates back to the early 2000s. I provide new 
evidence on both portfolio- and stock-level momentum, including during and after the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008, a period during which momentum has struggled. 
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4 DATA & METHODS 
4.1 Data 
My primary data consists of monthly returns on individual U.S. stock returns from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) from January 1926 to the June of 2018. 
I focus on U.S. common stocks (stocks with the share code 10 or 11 in the CRSP 
database). In addition, monthly market capitalization data from the CRSP database is 
collected. The sample consists of 3,143,667 firm-month observations, after forming 
momentum, which requires at least 13 months of return history.  
Microcap stocks represent only a very small fraction of total market capitalization and 
can be influential on results (Fama & French, 2008). Because of this, I further restrict 
the sample to exclude microcap stocks for my main results. I follow Fama and French 
(2008) and define microcaps as stocks below the 20th percentile of market 
capitalization. I also exclude stocks with missing market capitalization data. This 
restricts the sample into 2,514,738 firm-month observations. I reintroduce microcaps 
to the sample later in robustness tests. In robustness checks, I also consider megacaps, 
defined as the stocks above 80th percentile of market capitalization, large stocks, 
defined as the stocks between the 50th and 80th percentile of market capitalization, and 
small stocks, defined as the stocks between the 20th and 50th percentile of market 
capitalization, separately. 
In addition to the individual stocks, I decompose momentum in value-weighted 
industry and characteristic-sorted portfolios. This allows for making some meaningful 
comparisons to prior literature on momentum decomposition that mainly focuses on 
portfolios. Four portfolio datasets are considered. The first two are 6 and 25 Fama and 
French value-weighted portfolios, double sorted by book-to-market ratio and market 
capitalization, henceforth referred to as Fama and French portfolios. The other two 
portfolio datasets are 10 and 30 value-weighted portfolios, sorted by industry, 
henceforth referred to as industry portfolios. The monthly return data for all portfolio 
datasets are collected from Kenneth French’s data library (French, 2018). 
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Panel A of table 1 presents the summary statistics for market capitalization, returns, 
momentum and the length of the return series, after the formation of momentum, which 
takes up 13 return months. Panel C of table 1 presents the correlations between these 
variables for the CRSPs dataset, after the formation of momentum, with Spearman 
rank-order correlations in above-diagonal and Pearson product-momentum 
correlations in below-diagonal entries. The return length column presents summary 
statistics for the length of stocks return histories. We see from Panel A of table 1 that, 
after the formation of momentum, the average return history is only 82 return history 
months, and the sample contains stocks with just 14 return observations.  
Table 1. Summary statistics of the individual stock and portfolio data samples from 1926 to 
2018. 
 Panel A: Summary statistics for individual stock data 
 
MV Ret Mom Return length 
Min 0.459 -0.981 -0.998 14 
Mean 231.198 0.011 0.136 82 
Median 114.697 0.003 0.071 138.5 
Max 999.998 10.344 49.980 1102 
SD 258.845 0.143 0.571 154.2 
 Panel B: Return statistics for the portfolio data 
 FF6 FF25 Ind10 Ind30 
Min -0.351 -0.495 -0.348 -0.509 
Mean 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.010 
Median 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.011 
Max 0.836 1.475 0.798 1.254 
SD 0.068 0.077 0.060 0.070 
 Panel C: Correlations of the key variables in the CRSP dataset 
 
MV Ret Mom Return length 
MV  0.022 0.18 0.223 
Ret -0.008  0.05 0.045 
Mom 0.109 0.014  0.109 
Return length 0.205 0.014 0.027  
Panel A contains statistics for the four key variables in the CRSP sample of individual stocks. MV = market 
capitalization in 1 000 000s, Ret = monthly return, Mom = the cumulative 11-month past return one month 
prior to the return month, Return length = length of the return series after the formation of the momentum 
variable.  
Min = sample minimum, Mean = sample average, Median = sample median, Max = sample maximum, SD = 
standard deviation. 
Panel B contain summary statistics for the returns of the four portfolio datasets. FF6 = Six market 
capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, FF25 = 25 market capitalization and book-to-market 
sorted portfolios, Ind10 = 10 industry portfolios, Ind30 = 30 industry portfolios.  
In panel C, below-diagonal entries represent Pearson product-moment correlations and above-diagonal entries 
represent Spearman rank-order correlations. 
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The correlations in Panel C of table 1 reveal that return length has a positive correlation 
with market capitalization, returns and momentum. The high positive correlation of 
between market capitalization and return length suggests, that the short return history 
stocks are mostly smaller stocks. The positive correlations between return length and 
returns and momentum, suggest that these short return history stocks also earn lower 
returns on average. 
4.2 Relative-weight momentum and the Lo and MacKinlay (1990) 
decomposition 
Prior work on decomposing momentum varies in their use of formation and holding 
periods.  I focus is on the most common measure used in the literature, the cumulative 
returns of an asset compounded over months 𝑡 − 12 through month 𝑡 − 2. One month 
is skipped between the portfolio holding period and the formation period to avoid the 
reversals that returns tend to exhibit at shorter horizons (Jegadeesh, 1990, Lehmann, 
1990). For momentum in portfolios of stocks, the month before portfolio holding 
period has a significant positive effect on performance instead (Grundy & Martin, 
2001). In robustness checks, I consider strategies that do not skip the latest month for 
all datasets, as well as alternative formation and holding periods in subsection 5.6. 
The strategies I consider are relative strength strategies that hold assets in proportion 
to their return at time 𝑡 − 2 relative to the return of an equal-weighted index. The 
weights 𝑤𝑖,𝑡, for asset 𝑖 in month 𝑡 is given by 
𝑤𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?𝑡−2
11 ) ,  
(1) 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11
 is the realized cumulative 11-month return of an asset at month t-2, i.e. 
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𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11  = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝑡−13:𝑡−2
− 1 . (2) 
The term ?̅?𝑡−2
11  in equation (1) is the equally weighted mean of the 11-month returns on 
all assets at t-2. The weights add up to zero, meaning that the strategy is market-neutral 
long/short strategy, and the weights are scaled each period such, that each month, the 
strategy invests 1$ long and 1$ short. The return on the portfolio in period t is then 
𝜋𝑡 =
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑡(𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?𝑡−2
11  ).
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(3) 
Lo and MacKinlay(1990) show that rearranging equation (3), and taking expectations 
on both sides yields:7 
𝐸[𝜋𝑡] =
1
𝑁
𝐸 [∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11  𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑖
] −
1
𝑁
𝐸 [?̅?𝑡−2
11  ∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
𝑖
]
=
1
𝑁
∑(𝜌𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖
2)
𝑖
− (𝜌𝑚 + 𝜇𝑚
2 ) 
(4) 
Where 𝜌𝑖 and  𝜌𝑚 are the respective autocovariances (between 1-month and 11-month 
returns) of asset i and the equally-weighted market index, and 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜇𝑚 are their 
unconditional expected returns. Equation (4) shows, that the returns to momentum 
depend on the assets’ autocovariances relative to the autocovariance of the equally 
                                                 
7 The full derivation of the decomposition is shown in Appendix 1.1 
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weighted market index. Rearranging this equation, we can write the expected return in 
matrix notation as 
𝐸[𝜋𝑡] =
1
𝑁
𝑡𝑟(𝛺) −
1
𝑁2
1′𝛺1 + 𝜎𝜇𝛾. 
(5) 
In equation (5), 1 denotes an (𝑁 ×  1)  vector of ones, 𝛺 is the autocovariance matrix 
𝛺 ≡ 𝐸[(𝑟𝑡−2
11 −  𝛾)(𝑟𝑡 − 𝜇)′] and the notation 𝑡𝑟(. ) denotes the trace of a matrix. In 
equation (5), the first term is the cross-sectional average of the autocovariances of the 
individual securities, the second term is the autocovariance of the equal-weighted 
market index, and the third term 𝜎𝜇𝛾 is the cross-sectional covariance between the 
unconditional 11-month expected returns, 𝛾 = 𝐸[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
11], and the unconditional 1-month 
expected returns 𝐸[𝑟𝑖,𝑡]. The term 𝜎𝜇𝛾  represents the contribution of variation in 
unconditional expected returns. Equation (5) can be further rearranged into: 
𝐸[𝜋𝑡] =
𝑁 − 1
𝑁2
𝑡𝑟(𝛺) −
1
𝑁2
[𝜄′𝛺𝜄 − 𝑡𝑟(𝛺)] + 𝜎𝜇𝛾. 
(6) 
Now, if we denote 𝐶 ≡ −
1
𝑁2
[1′𝛺1 − 𝑡𝑟(𝛺)] and 𝑂 ≡ (
𝑁−1
𝑁2
) 𝑡𝑟(𝛺), equation (6) can 
be rewritten as: 
𝐸[𝜋𝑡] = 𝑂 + 𝐶 + 𝜎𝜇𝛾. (7) 
In equation (7), 𝐶 represents the contribution of cross-covariances to the returns of the 
momentum strategy, O represents the contribution of stock-specific autocovariances 
and 𝜎𝜇𝛾 represents the contribution of cross-sectional variation in unconditional 
expected returns. The term O depends only on the diagonal elements of the 
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autocovariance matrix, i.e., the own-autocovariances in returns of each asset and the 
term C only depends on the off-diagonal elements of the autocovariance matrix, i.e. 
assets’ cross-covariances. The negative sign on C and positive sign on O show that 
positive cross-covariances contribute negatively to momentum, while positive 
autocovariances contribute positively, and vice versa. 
4.3 Decomposition estimation 
I begin my empirical analysis with an examination of the standard decomposition used 
in prior literature. I estimate momentum returns and the decomposition for the stock- 
and portfolio-level datasets. I use sample auto- and cross-covariance estimates to form 
the cross-covariance matrix 𝛺. This is straightforward for portfolio-level data, but 
difficult for individual stocks, because we have a large number of assets, which all 
have varying lengths of return histories, including some quite short time-series of 
return observation. I tackle this problem by estimating the decomposition with a 
rolling-window methodology as follows. For every 12-month period in the sample, I 
find the stocks that have full return histories over the past 24 months. This is done to 
ensure that our set of stocks has at least 24 months of overlapping return observations. 
I then estimate the momentum decomposition on these selected stocks over the entire 
sample period. I estimate the autocovariances using the full time-series’ of returns over 
the entire sample period, and cross-covariances using full overlapping pairwise return 
histories for each pair of sampled stocks. Moving forward 12 months in time, and 
repeating the above procedure allows us to form an annual time-series of component 
estimates. 
The requirement for 24 months is a tradeoff between estimation error and data 
availability. For individual stocks, we need a period of where all sampled assets have 
non-missing returns. Requiring 24 months excludes stocks with shorter return histories 
than 36 months, because we require 12 months initially to form momentum. A longer 
estimation period eliminates stocks with short return histories from the sample, 
introducing a survivorship bias. Shorter horizon introduces more noise relative to 
signal in the estimation of the contributions. Furthermore, short return histories cause 
positive bias in estimates of the cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected 
returns, because unconditional expected returns are estimated with error, and the 
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estimate for the variation in unconditional expected returns picks up this error in 
addition to the true variation. 
While this method results in an annual time-series of the contributions, the time-
evolution in the time-series of estimated components only result from evolution in the 
universe of available stocks, because auto-covariances, cross-covariances and 
unconditional expected returns are estimated using full return histories. To examine 
time-variation in the contributions, I utilize a strategy-based decomposition instead. 
The strategy-based decomposition is discussed in detail in subsection 4.5. 
It is important to note that scaling the momentum strategy weights creates a distinction 
between the momentum strategy and the components in the decomposition. The 
investment weights in the momentum strategy are scaled such that they 1$ long and 
1$ short each period. This means that the weights are multiplied by a scaling factor, 
𝑠𝑡 = 2 ∗ ∑
1
|𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11 −?̅?𝑡−2
11 |
,𝑁𝑖=1  which is a multiple of the inverse of the cross-sectional mean 
absolute deviation of the returns over the momentum period. This introduces a 
conditioning on cross-sectional return dispersion to momentum. Now, if momentum 
returns vary conditional on the dispersion in returns over the momentum, the 
unconditional decomposition is incompatible with the actual momentum returns. Prior 
literature (see e.g. Lewellen, 2002 and DeMiguel, Nogales & Uppal, 2014) chooses to 
ignore this inconsistency and treats s, as a constant, using the expected value of s, 
𝐸[𝑠] =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑠𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , to scale the contributions to the right magnitude. I follow this 
convention in estimating the standard decomposition. 
Statistical significance for the estimated contributions is difficult to assess analytically. 
For the portfolio data, I follow Lewellen (2002), and measure statistical significance 
of the components using bootstrapped critical values. I first demean the return series 
and then sample individual returns for each asset from the demeaned return series with 
replacement. I then compute the decomposition for a momentum strategy using these 
artificial time-series of returns. Repeating this procedure 500 times results in a 
bootstrap distribution of component estimates under the null hypothesis of no time-
series predictability and no cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected returns. 
For individual stocks the estimation is conducted in windows, generating a time-series 
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of component estimates. A bootstrap method would be computationally costly, so I 
elect to use the t-statistic of the time-series component estimates to measure statistical 
significance. 
4.4 Biased estimation and a bootstrap experiment 
Conrad & Kaul (1998) find that variation in the unconditional expected return 
estimates for individual stocks exceed momentum returns by a large margin. Thus, the 
time-series components seemingly contribute negatively to momentum returns, while 
all momentum returns seem to be driven by variation in unconditional expected 
returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) show that the results in Conrad & Kaul (1998) 
are affected by what they call a small-sample bias. Adapting Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2002), when unconditional expected returns for the 11-month cumulative returns and 
monthly returns are estimated with error, such that: 
𝜇?̌? = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝜇𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾?̌? = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝛾𝑖 , (8) 
where 𝜇?̌? and 𝛾?̌? are the estimated 1-month and 11-month expected returns and 𝜀𝜇𝑖  and 
𝜀𝛾𝑖 their respective error terms. Indeed, ?̌?𝑖 and 𝛾?̌? are unbiased estimators of the true 
unconditional expected returns, since 𝐸(𝜀𝛾𝑖) = 𝐸(𝜀𝜇𝑖) = 0. However, the cross-
sectional covariance estimate is biased upwards. 8  To see this, note that the cross-
sectional covariance estimate 𝜎?̌??̌? is given by: 
𝜎?̌??̌? = 𝜎𝜇𝛾 + 𝜎𝜀𝜇𝜀𝛾  , (9) 
                                                 
8 Earlier, we presented the cross-sectional variation in expected returns -component of the return as the 
covariance between the 11-month cumulative return and the monthly return. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2002) use holding period and of the same length, which simplifies the equation to being the cross-
sectional variance. 
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where 𝜎𝜇𝛾 is the true covariance between the 11-month and 1-month expected returns 
and 𝜎𝜀𝜇𝜀𝛾 is the covariance between the estimation errors. Because the 11-month and 
1-month expected return estimates are positively correlated, it follows that 𝐸(𝜎𝜀𝜇𝜀𝛾) >
0. To see why Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) call this a small sample bias, note that the 
covariance of the error terms approaches zero as the amount of observations increases, 
i.e. 𝜎𝜀𝜇𝜀𝛾 → 0, when 𝑇 → ∞.  
To illustrate this small-sample bias, I replicate a bootstrap experiment conducted by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2002). First, I randomly sample from each assets return history, 
forming a new time-series of returns for the asset. This procedure is designed to 
scramble the returns such that there is no time-series predictability in the return series. 
I then form momentum strategies that should, by construction, depend only on the 
cross-sectional variance of the unconditional expected returns of the assets. Repeating 
the procedure 500 times results in a bootstrap distribution of momentum returns, when 
returns have no time-series predictability. If momentum is driven by variation in 
unconditional expected returns, then returns should be high for these momentum 
strategies as well.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) show that in such a setting sampling with replacement 
causes individual extreme return observations to enter into the return series both in the 
formation and holding period. These occurrences cause abnormally high returns to 
momentum in the artificial return series. When sampling without replacement, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) find that momentum profits in the scrambled return 
series are very small, and much smaller than true momentum profits. To replicate this 
analysis, I construct the bootstrap experiment using sampling both with and without 
replacement. 
There is some discussion in statistics literature of the sensitivity of sample 
autocovariance estimates to outlier observations. For example, Chan (1992) shows that 
very few additive outliers can cause information in sample autocovariance estimates 
to decay completely. He also shows that as few as two innovational outliers can cause 
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bias, that is not fully eliminated even as 𝑇 → ∞.9 Stock returns are known to exhibit 
extreme returns fairly frequently, and return histories for individual stocks are fairly 
short. This suggests that decomposition estimates of auto- and cross-covariances may 
suffer from biases. 
I test for the existence of bias in the estimates of the contributions of auto- and cross-
covariances by extending the bootstrap setting described above, by decomposing 
momentum returns for each bootstrap replication. Because the random sampling 
removes any true time-series dependence from returns, autocovariances and cross-
covariances should have no significant contribution to the momentum returns in the 
bootstrap. However, if auto- or cross-covariances have significant positive or negative 
contributions in the scrambled return series, this indicates that auto- and cross-
covariance estimates are biased. Here, the results for the bootstrap, sampling without 
replacement is more informative of the magnitude and direction of these biases. When 
sampling with replacement, we encounter the previous problem of extreme 
observations potentially being present in both formation and holding periods. 
For the portfolio datasets, I randomly sample return observations for all of the 
portfolios jointly. This allows for maintaining the contemporaneous covariance 
structure between the portfolios. For the portfolio datasets, I then construct a full 
decomposition for each bootstrap replication, reporting the average contributions. 
Because individual stocks have varying and non-overlapping return histories, I instead 
randomly sample for each asset separately. Thus, a complete decomposition is 
impossible. Instead, I compute return autocovariance for each stock separately, and 
compute the contribution of autocovariance as the average return autocovariance, 
weighted by the number of observations on each stock. I then report the average 
contribution of autocovariances from the bootstrap replications. While this does not 
enable us to compare autocovariances and cross-covariances, it allows us to analyze 
whether the bias in autocovariances might be present in individual stocks as well. 
                                                 
9 For further discussion on sample autocovariance estimates and outliers, see e.g. Chan (1992, 1995) 
and Deutsch, Richards & Swain (1990). 
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Statistical significance for all component estimates is measured by t-statistics from the 
bootstrap replications. 
4.4.1 Adjusting for extreme return observations with winsorization 
I examine the relationship between the biases and extreme returns, by estimating the 
original decomposition and the bootstrap experiment again with returns series, where 
extreme return observations are pulled in. Because the goal here is not to form an 
investable strategy, but to weed out extreme return observations that affect the sample 
estimates, I elect to use winsorized returns. My choice is motivated by Welch (2017) 
who shows that returns winsorized at levels between 10% and 20% produce more 
persistent estimates of standard deviations and market-betas, when using daily returns. 
While winsorization is an unconventional choice for dealing with returns, it pulls in 
extreme return observations with little computational complexity and affects fewer 
return observations than shrinkage estimators, which require more computational 
effort and shrink all returns towards their mean. Furthermore, the extreme return 
observations are often related to common rather than idiosyncratic events and these 
common events occur fairly frequently throughout the sample period. This makes it 
difficult to reduce the effect of extreme returns by focusing on any subset of stocks or 
specific time period. I provide an alternative method of adjusting for extreme returns 
with the strategy-based decomposition, discussed in subsection 4.5. 
I winsorize returns at an aggressive 10% level in for individual stocks, as suggested by 
Welch (2017). Because the portfolio datasets consist of aggregated returns, they suffer 
less from extreme return observations. I winsorize portfolio returns at a more 
conservative 1% level. To confirm that momentum exists in these winsorized return 
series, I recompute momentum strategy returns for these new series. After this, I repeat 
the decomposition procedure. I also rerun the bootstrap experiment described above to 
examine the extent to which winsorization alleviates the biases. If the sensitivity of 
sample estimates to outliers is the cause of the biases, the biases should be less 
pronounced in the bootstrap experiment and provide a more accurate representation of 
the drivers of momentum in the decomposition. 
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4.5 Strategy-based decomposition 
My main method of adjusting for extreme return observations is a strategy-based 
decomposition novel to the literature. I solve the Lo and MacKinlay (1990) 
decomposition for three individual investment strategies, each corresponding to one 
element of the decomposition. This provides a simple and computationally feasible 
solution to this specific problem and gives a new interpretation to each component as 
an investable strategy. 
Take the relative-weight momentum strategy, where assets are weighted by their past 
11-month returns (skipping the month prior to the holding period) relative to the return 
of their equally weighted index over the same period, i.e. 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?𝑡−2
11 ) . 
Using the same notation as in subsection 4.2, we can rewrite the strategy weights as: 
𝑤𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁
(
𝑁 − 1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11)) −
1
𝑁
(?̅?𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?11 −
1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11))
+
1
𝑁
(𝜇𝑖
11 − ?̅?11). 
(10) 
Now, substituting 𝑤𝑜 ≡
1
𝑁
(
𝑁−1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11)) , 𝑤𝑐 ≡ −
1
𝑁
(?̅?𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?11 −
1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑡−2
11 −
𝜇𝑖
11) and  w𝜇𝛾 ≡
1
𝑁
(𝜇𝑖
11 − ?̅?11) in equation (10), we get: 
𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = wo + wc + w𝜇𝛾 . (11) 
The returns to the momentum strategy can be written as 
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𝜋𝑡 =  𝑤𝑖,𝑡ri,t = wori,t + wcri,t + wμri,t (12) 
Here, we have three strategies.  Following Lo and MacKinlay (1990), it is 
straightforward to show that the expected returns to the strategies in equation (12) 
correspond to the contributions of their respective component, autocovariances, cross-
covariances and cross-sectional variance in unconditional expected returns, i.e., 
𝜎𝜇𝛾 ≡ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖
11𝜇𝑖), 
𝑂 ≡
𝑁 − 1
𝑁2
𝑡𝑟(Ω), 
𝐶 ≡
1′Ω1 − tr(Ω)
𝑁2
, 
where Ω is once again the cross-covariance matrix between the current 1-month and 
past 11-month returns. 10 Now, observing the returns to the strategies formed on these 
weights, allows us to observe, how autocovariances, cross-covariances and 
unconditional expected returns contribute to momentum returns.  
The strategy weights merit some interpretation. The unconditional expected return –
strategy, 𝜎𝜇𝛾, is straightforward. We have a zero-investment strategy that weights 
assets in proportion to their unconditional expected 11-month return, relative to the 
unconditional expected  11-month return of the equally weighted market index, going 
long (short) in assets with high (low) unconditional expected returns. The 
autocovariance strategy, O, weights assets based on their momentum period return, 
relative to the unconditional expected return on the asset. The constant 
𝑁−1
𝑁
 is 
inconsequential, but included to account for the fact, that the cross-covariance strategy 
deducts the assets own return from the equally-weighted index return. The strategy 
                                                 
10 The full derivations for these decompositions and the strategy weights are shown in Appendix 1 
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takes on a net long (short) position, when the momentum return of the equally-
weighted index is above (below) its unconditional expected return. 
The cross-covariance strategy, C, weights assets in proportion to the return of the 
equally-weighted index return relative to its unconditional expectation. The 
contribution of the assets own return and expected return to the index and the expected 
return of the index, respectively are deducted from the weights. In other words, the 
cross-covariance strategy weights depend on the returns of all assets in the momentum 
period except itself. As N grows larger, the effect of deducting the asset-specific return 
does not cause much dispersion in the weights. Now, because the holding period 
returns add up the equally-weighted index return, the strategy essentially simplifies 
into a contrarian market timing strategy. The strategy invests long (short), when the 
equally-weighted index momentum return is below (above) its unconditional 
expectation. 
The most important feature of the strategy-based decomposition is that it allows us to 
directly tackle the biases caused by extreme returns on unconditional expected returns. 
Rewriting the momentum strategy into three separate strategies gives an interpretation 
of the biases as a forward-looking bias. For each of the three strategies, an investor 
needs an ex-ante estimate of the unconditional expected return, 𝜇𝑖
11 (henceforth 
referred to as 𝜇 without the subscripts for simplicity), to form the strategy weights. 
When we have extreme return observations that contribute heavily to the individual 
unconditional expected returns, it would be easy to accumulate high returns by 
selecting stocks by estimates of their unconditional expected returns, when these high 
estimates of unconditional expected returns are caused by large future returns. Writing 
the components as strategies, we see that this is essentially what happens with the 
unconditional decomposition. Because the unconditional expected return strategy 
weights depend positively on 𝜇, a forward-looking estimate introduces positive bias to 
the role of unconditional expected returns, which is what we see both in the 
unconditional decomposition, as well as the bootstrap experiment. 
The weights on the autocovariance and cross-covariance strategies depend on 𝜇 as 
well. Thus, the approach does not only allow us to interpret the strange behavior of 
unconditional expected returns in the decomposition, but the negative bias in 
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autocovariances as well. The autocovariance strategy weights negatively depend on 𝜇 
and thus, the strategy tends to assign larger (smaller) weights to assets with extreme 
negative (positive) return realizations over their return history. This leads to large 
negative returns for the strategy in periods, when these extreme returns occur, causing 
a negative bias to the component. The cross-covariance strategy-weights depend on 
𝜇 positively, but to a lesser degree, as the asset specific returns are divided by the 
number of assets N. When N is large, the positive bias to cross-covariances is likely 
inconsequential. The interpretation of these biases as forward-looking biases allows us 
to tackle them directly, by using out-of-sample estimates of unconditional expected 
returns. In removing return observations, we induce more estimation error, but this is 
a trivial concern compared to the bias, that including holding period returns into the μ 
estimates induces.  
The second attractive quality of this approach is that it makes it easy to estimate the 
components for individual stocks, because a cross-covariance matrix is not needed. 
Thus, returns can be estimated using the whole available universe of stocks. 
Furthermore, looking at the strategies’ performance over time, naturally allows us to 
look for time-variance in the contributions. 
A careful reader will note that the portfolios of cross-covariances and autocovariances 
are not zero-investment arbitrage portfolios. The strategies dependent on 
autocovariances and cross-covariances take on time-varying short and long positions 
depending on the formation period returns of each asset relative to their unconditional 
expected returns. The autocovariance strategy resembles the time-series momentum 
strategies explored by Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012). Goyal and Jegadeesh 
(2018) point out that the returns to such strategies are not directly comparable to the 
cross-sectional momentum strategy. They argue that, because “the differences between 
these strategies are entirely due to the time-series behavior of equal-weighted index 
returns, we cannot learn anything about the behavior of individual stock returns from 
the differences in these two strategies”. Indeed, the differences between these 
strategies arise from the time-series behavior of the equal-weighted index return. 
However, Goyal and Jegadeesh (2018) fail to mention the fact that the time-series 
behavior of the equal-weighted index arises from the autocovariances and cross-
covariances of the individual stock returns. While Goyal and Jegadeesh (2018) make 
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a convincing case against using time-series momentum as a return factor, I argue that 
the strategies I employ can still be informative of the return mechanism behind 
momentum. 
Furthermore, it is easy to see that these strategies do not accumulate returns by loading 
on market returns. While the autocovariance and cross-covariance strategies are not 
long/short arbitrage strategies the expected net long/short position of each strategy is 
0. To see this, note that in the long run 𝐸[𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11] = E[?̅?𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?11] = 0. Returns 
only arise from a market timing element. The positive autocovariance takes on a net 
long (short) position, when the equal-weighted index returns over the portfolio 
formation period are above (below) its expected return, while the cross-covariance 
strategy takes on an offsetting net short (long) position. The cross-covariance strategy 
depends mostly on the equal-weighted index return, and as such its returns are 
informative of the contribution of the market timing element. Because the positions 
offset, the returns to the positive autocovariance strategy are driven by its market 
timing element only to the extent that these returns show up of the opposite direction 
in the cross-covariance strategy. 
4.5.1 Estimation methods for the strategy-based decomposition 
With the strategy-based decomposition, the average contributions of each component 
can be now viewed as the average returns to the corresponding strategy. I study the 
returns to investing into these strategies throughout the sample period and report the 
average returns as annualized percentage returns. I establish statistical significance 
using t-statistics.  
I discuss above in subsection 4.3, how the investment in the relative-weight strategy 
is scaled by to be 1$ long and 1$ short each period. More accurately, the weights are 
multiplied at each period t by 𝑠𝑡 = 2 ∗ ∑
1
|𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11 −?̅?𝑡−2
11 |
𝑁
𝑖=1  . This presents some problems 
with scaling the weights in the strategy-based decomposition. One option would be to 
scale the strategy weights for all three decomposition strategies by 𝑠𝑡, in which case 
the component strategy returns add up to momentum returns each period. However, 
this leads the autocovariance and cross-covariance -strategies to take on up to 10 times 
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leverage at times. Because the intuition of the strategy-based decomposition is to view 
the different drivers of momentum as investable strategies, I elect to instead scale the 
strategies based on their unique attributes, such that their investment returns are 
somewhat comparable. 
The unconditional expected return strategy is the most straightforward one. Because 
the weights of the unconditional expected return strategy add up to zero, it is a market 
neutral long-short strategy strategy weights can be scaled to 1$ long and 1$ short each 
period. However, the autocovariance and cross-covariance strategies are not long/short 
arbitrage strategies. The autocovariance strategy invests some portion long and some 
short each period. I scale the autocovariance and cross-covariance strategy weights 
such, that the strategy always invests 1$ and distributes it to the long and short legs, 
based on the strategy weights. In this case, the investment can be 1$ long (short), when 
all weights have positive (negative) sign. Furthermore, because the strategies are 
scaled similarly, the net long and short positions offset each other, leading to a 
combined long/short strategy, where the cross-covariance strategy offsets the net 
long/short position of the autocovariance strategy. This method of scaling preserves 
the important market-timing element of the strategies, while scaling investment to a 
meaningful level. While investment into these strategies is on average smaller than 
into the momentum and unconditional expected return strategies, it is important to note 
that the size of the investment does not affect the statistical significance of the returns. 
I explore the robustness of my results to alternative scaling schemes in subsection 
5.6.2. First, I include not scaling any strategy at all, in which case the components 
correspond to true cross-covariance and estimates also add up to momentum returns. 
This introduces large variation in the investment to both momentum and all component 
strategies. Second, I scale the strategies by the scaling of the momentum strategy, in 
which case the component strategy returns should again add up to exactly the 
momentum strategy returns. This introduces large variation in the investment into the 
component strategies, while investment into momentum remains the same. 
Last, I try scaling the autocovariance and cross-covariance strategy weights for each 
period such, that, for the autocovariance strategy, investment is 1$ long and less short, 
when the momentum period returns were on average positive and 1$ short and less 
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long, when they were negative. Because the cross-covariance strategy weights are of 
the same sign every period, this means that the strategy is 1$ long, when the equally 
weighted index return momentum is above its historical mean, and 1$ short when it is 
below. For the autocovariance strategy, investment ranges from 1$ long if momentum 
for all stocks is above the stocks’ historical mean momentum returns, to 1$ short if 
momentum returns for all stocks are below their respective historical means, to 1$ long 
and 1$ short, when momentum is above historical mean for half of the stocks and 
below for half of the stocks.  
Because the magnitude of component returns is affected by scaling I also run return 
regressions with momentum as the dependent variable and component strategies as 
independent variables. Because the strategies have high correlations with each other, 
regressing momentum returns on all the components jointly, results in a 
multicollinearity problem, and we cannot make meaningful inference on whether one 
of the components subsumes the other by regressing momentum returns on all the 
strategies and looking at the regression coefficients. However, we can test the extent 
to which the excess returns in the momentum strategy are captured by any one 
component strategy, by regressing momentum returns on component strategies 
individually. I report full regression intercepts and coefficients along with respective 
t-statistics for the individual stocks, but focus only on regression intercepts and t-
statistics for the portfolio datasets. The regression intercepts are reported as annualized 
percentage returns and can be interpreted as the return not explained by an individual 
component strategy. To measure the statistical significance of the coefficients, I follow 
common practice in asset pricing literature and compute t-statistics using standard 
errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity with the robust estimator 
suggested by Newey and West (1987). 
Forming the component strategy weights also requires an ex-ante estimate of the 
unconditional expected return 𝜇. When using a lot of observations, we can obtain more 
accurate estimates of the unconditional expected return. However, return histories are 
short for individual stocks and, in doing so, we eliminate a part of the investable 
universe of stocks. For the individual stocks, I elect to use an expanding window up to 
the portfolio holding period. I require 24 individual observations of momentum returns 
to form initial estimates of the unconditional 11-month expected returns. This sums up 
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to a total of 36 months of return history required before a stock enters into the strategy. 
Because there are many stocks with very short return histories in the sample, 25% of 
the stocks with the shortest return histories are excluded from my sample. Because 
return histories to the portfolios extend throughout the sample, we can afford a longer 
estimation period. I elect to use the first 120 months to form initial estimates of μ and 
update estimates in an expanding window from there on. In subsection 5.5., I 
investigate, whether the mechanism behind momentum changes over time, by looking 
at the time-variance of the returns to the component strategies. For this purpose, I use 
120-month rolling estimates for the unconditional expected returns, again requiring 24 
months to form initial estimates. This allows us to somewhat relax the assumption of 
mean-stationary returns, that the use of an expanding estimation window imposes. 
Later in robustness checks I show, that my results are not sensitive to the choice of 
return history required, or using rolling estimates of μ. In robustness checks, I also 
consider return observations from post-holding periods in forming the μ estimate. This 
makes the strategies not investable in real time, but increases the return observations 
available, to improve accuracy of μ estimates. Excluding only the holding period 
returns from the μ estimates gives us the maximum possible amount of return 
observations, without including the holding period return in the estimate. 
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5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, I present my empirical results. I begin by estimating decompositions 
for individual stocks and portfolios of stocks in subsection 5.1, using the methods 
described in subsection 4.3. In subsection 5.2, I post evidence of biased estimation in 
the decomposition, using the bootstrap experiment described in subsection 4.4. I 
present decomposition and bootstrap results using winsorized returns in subsection 
5.3. In subsection 5.4. I present the main results for the strategy-based decomposition, 
discussed in subsection 4.5. I explore the potential time-variance in the return 
mechanism behind momentum in subsection 5.5. Finally, I test the robustness of my 
results to a variety of methodological choices in subsection 5.6.  
5.1 Momentum returns and the unconditional decomposition 
Table 2 presents the realized returns and results for the standard decomposition of 
momentum for the full sample from January 1926 to June 2018. Returns to the relative-
weight momentum strategies are highly statistically significant and economically large 
for all datasets. The returns to momentum in individual stocks are largest, around twice 
as large as to momentum in the portfolio datasets.  For each of the datasets, the 
expected returns, calculated as the sum of the decomposition components, match the 
realized returns relatively well. This suggests that scaling the strategy weights as 
discussed in subsection 4.3 does not drive major differences between the realized 
returns and an unconditional estimate of the expected return for these strategies. 
The decomposition of momentum in individual stocks is difficult to interpret. All 
individual components appear to contribute positively to momentum returns with 
similar magnitude and statistical significance. The estimate for the contributions of 
cross-covariances accounts for around 26.5% of the total expected momentum return. 
The estimate for the annualized return contribution of autocovariances accounts for 
36.1% of momentum returns. These estimates somewhat surprisingy suggest that 
autocovariances are in general positive, while cross-covariances are in general 
negative. 
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Table 2. Momentum strategy returns and unconditional decomposition results, in the sample 
period from 1926 to 2018, all datasets. 
Dataset Mom 𝐸[𝑀𝑜𝑚] C O 𝜎𝜇𝛾 
CRSP 11.90** 11.04** 2.93** 3.99** 4.14** 
 (6.04)     
FF6 5.16** 5.61** -0.68 4.71* 1.58** 
 (4.12)     
FF25 4.08** 2.36** -2.06** 2.82* 1.60** 
 (2.78)     
Ind10 4.70** 4.94** -1.88** 6.61** 0.21** 
 (3.16)     
Ind30 7.04** 6.14** -0.05 5.91** 0.29** 
 (4.47)     
The returns are reported as annualized percentage returns. Mom = realized momentum returns, 𝐸[𝑀𝑜𝑚] = the 
expected return of momentum, measured as the sum of the components, C = the contribution of cross-
covariances to momentum, O = the contribution of autocovariances to momentum, 𝜎𝜇𝛾 = the contribuution of 
cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected returns. 
CRSP = Individual US stock data, FF6 = Six market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, FF25 
= 25 market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, Ind10 = 10 industry portfolios, Ind30 = 30 
industry portfolios. 
Statistical significance is denoted by stars * = 0.05 level of significance ** = 0.01 level of significance. 
The estimate for the contribution of unconditional expected returns is the largest of the 
three, accounting for 37.5% of the estimated expected returns. The estimate for the 
cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected returns is much smaller relative to 
momentum returns than those found by Conrad & Kaul (1998) and Jegadeesh and 
Titman (2002). This is likely driven by methodological differences. The bootstrap 
methodology that I employ rules out all stocks with return histories shorter than 36 
months. Furthermore, I use an 11-month formation period, and a one-month holding 
period with a month skipped in between, while Conrad and Kaul (1998) and Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2002) only consider strategies that have identical and consecutive holding 
periods and formation periods. 
The significant contributions of return cross-covariances and cross-sectional variation 
in unconditional expected returns are difficult for theories on momentum to reconcile. 
The very high contribution of unconditional expected returns suggests a risk-based 
interpretation of momentum. Lewellen (2002) suggests two theories where momentum 
can be driven by negative cross-covariances. However, theories suggested by 
Lewellen (2002) assume that return autocovariances would negatively contribute to 
momentum returns. Here, we observe a positive contribution. The biases in the 
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decomposition, discussed in subsection 4.4, can somewhat reconcile these puzzling 
results. I examine these biases empirically in subsection 5.2. 
The results in table 2 for the portfolio datasets are more in line with theoretical 
literature. Positive autocovariances seem to explain most of momentum returns in 
portfolios. The autocovariance contributions are positive and statistically significant 
for each dataset. The contributions of autocovariances account for 84% to 134% of 
momentum returns in the portfolio datasets. Cross-covariances contribute negatively 
for all portfolio datasets, but cross-covariance estimates differ significantly from zero 
only for the 25 Fama and French characteristic-sorted portfolios and the 10 industry 
portfolios. 
My results differ from Lewellen (2002), who finds negative cross-covariances and 
autocovariances using a similar 12-month horizon. The difference between these 
results and Lewellen (2002) is likely explained by empirical choices. Lewellen (2002) 
studies momentum strategies that do not skip one month in between the portfolio 
formation period and the holding period. Furthermore, Lewellen (2002) studies 
portfolio returns from 1940 to 1999. Chen and Hong (2002) include the early part of 
the sample period in their results and find results similar to mine, although they use 6-
month formation and holding periods. Thus, including the early part of the sample 
from 1926 to 1940 seems to tilt results in favor of positive autocovariances. This is 
somewhat counterintuitive, because momentum strategies are not profitable post-2000 
or pre-1940. This suggests that autocovariances are positive during periods when 
momentum is not profitable and vice versa, supporting the role of negative cross-
covariances in explaining momentum. 
For all portfolio datasets the contributions of unconditional expected returns are 
positive and statistically significant but small compared to the contribution of return 
autocovariances. Variation in unconditional expected returns accounts for a 
significantly larger proportion of momentum returns in the Fama and French portfolios 
than in the industry portfolios. This is intuitive, since the Fama and French portfolio 
returns are related to the size- and value-factors and the portfolio sorting is specifically 
designed to bring out cross-sectional variation in expected returns.   
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5.2 Bootstrap evidence of biased estimation 
The results above for portfolios of stocks seem most supportive of positive 
autocovariances as the main driver of momentum, consistent with the implications of 
most popular theories. However, for individual stocks results are ambiguous, as all 
components appear to be about equally important in explaining momentum returns. 
This inconsistency might be attributable to biased estimation. Statistical literature 
documents that outlier observations give rise to biases in sample autocovariance 
estimates (see e.g. Chan (1992, 1995) and Deutsch, Richards & Swain (1990)), while 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) show that sample estimates of cross-sectional variance 
in expected returns are biased upwards by extremes returns and short return histories. 
Furthermore, intuition provided by the strategy-based decomposition in subsection 4.5 
suggest that the contribution of unconditional expected returns may be biased upwards, 
the contribution of autocovariances may be negatively biased to a similar degree and 
cross-covariances may be biased positively, but to a much smaller degree than the 
other two components. 
I examine whether these biases exist in the decomposition empirically by replicating a 
bootstrap experiment conducted by Jegadeesh and Titman (2002). The bootstrap 
experiment is designed to remove any time-series dependence from the return series. 
Thus, momentum in these return series’ can only be driven by cross-sectional variation 
in unconditional expected returns. I repeat the bootstrap both sampling with and 
without replacement to illustrate the upward bias to the contribution of unconditional 
expected returns. In addition, I decompose momentum in these bootstrap replications 
to examine whether the time-series component estimates suffer from biases. The 
bootstrap experiment is described in detail in subsection 4.4. 
Table 3 presents the average returns from 500 bootstrap replications for the 1926 to 
2018 sample period. Panel A presents results using sampling with replacement. For 
the individual stocks in the CRSP data sample, I find results similar to Conrad and 
Kaul (1998) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2002). The annualized percentage returns to 
momentum, using scrambled return series, are statistically significant at the 1% level 
and almost as large as true realized momentum returns over the same sample period. 
This seemingly suggests that most of momentum returns can be explained by cross-
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sectional variation in unconditional expected returns. However, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2002) show that this is due to the procedure of sampling with replacement. When we 
sample with replacement, individual extreme return observations can enter the sample 
in both portfolio formation and holding periods, causing a positive bias into the returns. 
Table 3. Average nomentum strategy returns and decomposition estimates from 500 bootstrap 
replications under the null hypothesis of no time-series dependence in returns, 1926 to 2018 
sample period. 
Dataset Mom C O 𝜎𝜇𝛾 
 Panel A: Returns sampled with replacement 
CRSP 8.08** - -2.59** - 
FF6 1.01** 2.08** -2.37** 1.79** 
FF25 1.14** 1.33* -1.72** 1.80** 
Ind10 0.17** 0.68* -0.95** 0.52** 
Ind30 0.27** 0.03 -0.48 0.73** 
 Panel B: Returns sampled without replacement 
CRSP -0.38 - -2.35** - 
FF6 0.83** 0.87 -1.17* 1.63** 
FF25 0.88** 1.90** -2.26** 1.44** 
Ind10 -0.12** 0.82** -1.13** 0.24** 
Ind30 -0.05 0.43 -0.83** 0.33** 
Returns and component estimates are reported in terms of annualized percentage returns. Mom = 
momentum returns, C = the contribution of cross-covariances to momentum, O = the contribution of 
autocovariances to momentum, 𝜎𝜇𝛾  = the contribuution of cross-sectional variation in unconditional 
expected returns. 
CRSP = Individual US stock data, FF6 = Six market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, 
FF25 = 25 market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, Ind10 = 10 industry portfolios, Ind30 
= 30 industry portfolios. 
Statistical significance is denoted by stars * = 0.05 level of significance ** = 0.01 level of significance. 
 
Panel B of table 3 presents the same results using sampling without replacement. Now, 
that extreme returns do not contribute to momentum returns in the same way, the 
returns to momentum in individual stocks are now statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. This result, consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (2002), suggests that the cross-
sectional variation in unconditional expected returns plays virtually no role in 
momentum in individual stocks and that estimates of the contribution of unconditional 
expected returns are positively biased. This finding is also consistent with intuition 
provided by the strategy-based decomposition. 
The portfolio returns consist of aggregated returns and thus do not exhibit such 
extreme return observations, so results are similar but less dramatic. When sampling 
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with replacement, momentum returns in the scrambled bootstrap are positive and 
statistically significant for all portfolio datasets but economically small. When 
sampling without replacement, momentum returns are positive only for the Fama and 
French portfolios. This is, again, consistent with the fact that the Fama and French 
portfolio returns are related to size and value factor returns and produce significant 
variation in unconditional expected returns.  Strikingly, for the 10 industry portfolios, 
returns are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This effect is 
economically small but puzzling. A potential explanation for such an effect is that 
industries, which generate large positive (negative) returns at times, have lower 
(higher) returns on average.11 
The other columns on table 3 report average decomposition estimates from the 
bootstrap replications. I focus on the results when sampling with replacement, because 
they are more representative of how the auto- and cross-covariance component 
estimates are affected by extreme returns. Because the individual stocks cannot be 
sampled in a way that maintains the contemporaneous covariance structure, I only 
report full decomposition results for the portfolio datasets. For individual stocks, I only 
report the contributions of autocovariances. 
For all datasets, we observe a statistically significant negative contribution by 
autocovariances, providing strong evidence that sample estimates of autocovariances 
are negatively biased. Although direct comparison is difficult due to methodological 
differences, the bootstrap results suggest that biased estimation contributes to the 
negative autocovariances found by Lewellen (2002), Pan (2010) and Du (2012). The 
contributions of cross-covariances provide some evidence of a positive bias to cross-
covariance contribution estimates. This positive bias in the contribution of cross-
covariances is smaller in magnitude than the negative bias to autocovariances for each 
of the datasets. Furthermore, the contributions are only statistically significant for the 
                                                 
11 Unreported tests support this intuition. For the 10 industry portfolio dataset, average returns have a 
strong cross-sectional correlation with the smallest quantiles (smaller than 1st percentile) of returns. The 
correlation is also notably stronger than the correlation between average returns and the largest quantiles 
of returns. This suggests that occasional large negative returns have a closer connection to large average 
returns than large positive return observations do. Furthermore, this relationship is unique to the 10 
industry portfolios among the portfolio datasets. 
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10 industry portfolios and 25 Fama and French portfolios. Results for the time-series 
components are consistent with the predictions provided by the strategy-based 
decomposition.  
5.3 Decomposition with winsorized returns 
Above, I argue that the bias exhibited in the bootstrap is caused by extreme returns. 
The bias can, of course, potentially arise due to some other reasons. I now empirically 
examine this potential link between the biases in the decomposition and extreme return 
observations by decomposing momentum in return series, where extreme return 
observations are pulled in by winsorizing the returns. The decomposition results 
should also give a more representative picture of the mechanism driving momentum. 
However, my main method for unbiased estimation of the decomposition is the 
strategy-based decomposition, discussed in subsection 5.4.  
The return column in Panel A of table 4 reports annualized percentage returns to 
(uninvestable) momentum strategies formed using these winsorized return series. The 
returns are winsorized at the 90% level for individual stocks and at the 1% level for 
the portfolio datasets. The 5% and 95% monthly return breakpoints are -19% and 
22.75% respectively for individual stocks. For the portfolio datasets, the monthly 
return breakpoints end up between -24.6% and -20.0% for the lower bound and 
between 20.8% and 32.1% for the upper bound. Momentum returns are positive and 
statistically significant across all datasets. The returns are also slightly larger for each 
dataset than momentum returns in the true return series. This suggests that the most 
extreme return observations drive momentum, but instead work against it to some 
degree. 
The component estimates in Panel A of table 4 provide consistent and strong support 
for the hypothesis that momentum is driven by positive return autocovariances. Across 
all datasets, autocovariances contribute positively and with high statistical 
significance. For individual stocks, autocovariances account for around 75% of the 
returns to momentum, while the contribution of cross-covariances is statistically 
insignificant. For the portfolio datasets, the results change even more drastically. The 
contributions of autocovariances far exceed momentum returns for all portfolio 
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datasets. The large positive contributions of positive autocovariances are offset to a 
degree by the negative contributions of positive cross-covariances, which are all 
statistically significant and economically large. 
Table 4. Momentum returns and decomposition estimates in winsorized returns 1926-2018. 
Dataset Return C O 𝜎𝜇𝛾 
 Panel A: Return decomposition. 
CRSP 12.73** -0.90 9.54** 3.41** 
FF6 5.55** -7.98** 12.47** 1.05** 
FF25 5.35** -7.74** 10.77** 1.34** 
Ind10 5.37** -6.15** 11.19** 0.18** 
Ind30 8.05** -3.27** 10.28** 0.30** 
 Panel B: Scrambled bootstrap, sampling without replacement. 
CRSP 3.14** - -1.11** - 
FF6 0.65** 0.18 -0.40 1.09** 
FF25 1.04** 0.50 -0.71 1.30** 
Ind10 -0.07 0.60* -0.85** 0.22** 
Ind30 -0.04 0.37 -0.78** 0.37** 
Returns and component estimates are reported in terms of annualized percentage returns.  
C = the contribution of cross-covariances to momentum, O = the contribution of autocovariances to 
momentum, 𝜎𝜇𝛾  = the contribuution of cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected returns. 
CRSP = Individual US stock data, FF6 = Six market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, 
FF25 = 25 market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, Ind10 = 10 industry portfolios, Ind30 
= 30 industry portfolios. Returns for the CRSP dataset are winsorized at the 90% level. Returns for the 
portfolio datasets are winsorized at the 99% level. 
Statistical significance is denoted by stars: * = 0.05 level of significance, ** = 0.01 level of significance. 
 
Unconditional expected returns contribute statistically significantly and positively for 
all datasets. Variation in unconditional expected returns account for around 26% of 
momentum returns for individual stocks and a similar proportion of momentum returns 
in the Fama and French portfolios. For the 10 and 30 industry portfolios, the 
contribution of unconditional expected returns is tiny compared to momentum returns.  
In Panel B of table 4, I report the results from the bootstrap experiment without 
replacement, repeated using winsorized returns. Momentum returns are now positive 
and statistically significant for the individual stocks, which is close to the estimate of 
cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected returns that we find in the 
decomposition in Panel A of table 4. Momentum returns for the Fama and French 
portfolios also remain positive, and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that extreme returns do not drive the differences in unconditional expected returns for 
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these portfolios. For the industry portfolios, bootstrap returns are small and 
indistinguishable from zero. 
The negative biases to autocovariances are still present and statistically significant at 
the 1% level for both the industry portfolios and individual stocks. However, the bias 
to autocovariance estimates for the Fama and French portfolios become statistically 
insignificant. Furthermore, winsorizing returns does reduce the magnitude of the bias 
in all datasets. The positive bias in the contribution of cross-covariances is statistically 
significant for only the 10 industry portfolios dataset.  
Overall, the results above suggest that extreme returns are at least partly responsible 
for the biases in decomposition estimates. An alternative interpretation of the results 
in table 4 is that returns exhibit reversals around extreme returns and winsorizing 
returns diminishes these reversal effects, shifting return autocovariances towards being 
more positive. This notion is supported by the fact that returns to momentum are 
improved in winsorized returns for each dataset, although the increases in returns are 
quite small. Furthermore, winsorizing returns does not reconcile the biases in the 
decomposition particularly well. I now move on to the strategy-based decomposition, 
which provides an alternative method to estimate the decomposition without bias. 
5.4 Strategy-based decomposition of momentum returns 
The strategy-based decomposition focuses on, whether an investor can utilize the 
different drivers of momentum by targeting them directly, using ex-ante information. 
To establish the validity of the strategy-based decomposition framework, I begin by 
briefly studying the decomposition using full in-sample estimates of unconditional 
expected returns, 𝜇. Results should be similar to the results from the unconditional 
decomposition in subsection 5.1. I then re-estimate strategy returns, when 
unconditional expected returns are estimated using only information available ex-ante. 
Because the strategy weights here are scaled individually to form realistic investable 
strategies, the individual components do not add up to the strategy returns, so inference 
is more reliant on the sign and statistical significance of the components and return 
regressions, in which momentum returns are regressed on component strategy returns.  
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5.4.1 Strategy returns using full sample estimates 
The strategy returns using full return histories, including the formation period and 
holding period returns, to form unconditional expected return estimates are presented 
in table 5. The results on portfolio data are somewhat consistent with the 
decomposition results presented in subsection 5.1. Returns to the autocovariance 
strategies are positive for all datasets but are statistically significant only for the two 
industry portfolio datasets. Returns to the cross-covariance strategy appear negative 
but are statistically indistinguishable from zero across all datasets. 
Table 5. Returns to momentum and component strategy returns, using full-sample estimates of 
the unconditional expected return from the 1926 to 2018 sample period. 
Dataset Return C O 𝜎𝜇𝛾 
CRSP 
11.90** -0.46 3.14 27.12** 
(6.04) (-0.26) (1.41) (24.34) 
FF6 
5.16** -0.42 2.11 5.17** 
(4.12) (-0.20) (0.92) (4.18) 
FF25 
4.08** -0.39 1.38 6.06** 
(2.78) (-0.17) (0.57) (5.47) 
Ind10 
4.70** -1.77 4.03* 2.26 
(3.16) (-1.05) (2.15) (1.88) 
Ind30 
7.04** -0.93 3.87* 3.02** 
(4.47) (-0.54) (2.00) (4.29) 
Returns to all strategies are reported in terms of annualized percentage returns. Respective t-statistics are 
reported below the returns in parenthesis. 
Return = returns to the momentum strategy, C = returns to the cross-covariance strategy, O = returns to the 
autocovariance strategy, 𝜎𝜇𝛾 = returns to the unconditional expected return strategy. 
CRSP = Individual US stock data, FF6 = Six market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, 
FF25 = 25 market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, Ind10 = 10 industry portfolios, Ind30 
= 30 industry portfolios.  
Statistical significance is denoted by stars: * = 0.05 level of significance, ** = 0.01 level of significance. 
 
 
Returns to the unconditional expected return strategies are statistically significant for 
all datasets, except for the 10 industry portfolios. Returns to the unconditional expected 
return -strategy are very large in each dataset compared to what we find using the 
standard decomposition. For individual stocks, the returns far exceed momentum 
returns, in line with the findings of Conrad and Kaul (1998). 
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There are two main reasons as to why the strategy returns differ from the unconditional 
decomposition results discussed in subsection 5.1. First, for individual stocks, unlike 
the rolling window methodology used in subsection 5.1, the strategy-based 
decomposition does not exclude stocks with shorter return histories, so the sample 
includes stocks with shorter histories. The second reason is the fact that we scale the 
weights individually. Because the cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected 
returns is smaller than the cross-sectional variation in individual return observations, 
the “investment” into a momentum strategy towards unconditional expected returns is 
smaller than in a strategy that targets unconditional expected returns directly. 
5.4.2 Strategy returns using out-of-sample estimates 
Table 6 presents annualized percentage returns and respective t-statistics (in 
parentheses) for momentum and component strategies that are investable in real time, 
i.e. using an ex-ante estimate of the unconditional expected return. Estimates are 
computed in an expanding window for all datasets, with 24 observations of momentum 
required for individual stocks and 120 observations required for the portfolio datasets. 
The results for individual stocks and industry portfolios support the hypothesis that 
momentum is driven by positive return autocovariances. Returns to the autocovariance 
strategy in these datasets are positive, statistically significant and economically large, 
albeit markedly smaller than returns to momentum. Return autocovariances are also 
the only component with positive returns. The cross-covariance strategy earns a small 
negative return, statistically indistinguishable from zero for individual stocks and both 
industry portfolio datasets. Returns to the unconditional expected return strategy are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero for the industry portfolio datasets and 
statistically significantly negative for individual stocks. 
The negative returns to the unconditional expected return strategy for individual stocks 
merit further attention. A zero-investment contrarian strategy that is long stocks with 
low historical returns and short stocks with high historical returns earns an 
economically large and highly statistically significant return. Of course, cross-
sectional variation in true unconditional expected returns by definition cannot 
contribute negatively to momentum. However, the strategy returns suggest that taking 
advantage of the cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected returns is not 
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feasible for an investor in real time. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the past 11-month 
returns are a better proxy for the unconditional expected returns than full return 
histories of stocks. Consistent with the bootstrap experiment results, variation in 
unconditional expected returns is seems to not be an important driver of momentum. 
Table 6. Returns to momentum and component strategy returns, using expanding-window 
estimates of the unconditional expected, 1926 to 2018 sample period. 
Dataset Mom C O 𝜎𝜇𝛾 
CRSP 
10.47** -0.44 6.01** -4.66** 
(5.31) (-0.25) (2.75) (-3.69) 
FF6 
4.86** 1.30 0.27 4.37** 
(3.95) (0.71) (0.13) (3.95) 
FF25 
4.59** 1.33 -0.11 4.34** 
(3.34) (0.70) (-0.05) (5.18) 
Ind10 
4.15** -1.19 3.32* -0.25 
(2.81) (-0.85) (2.07) (-0.22) 
Ind30 
7.20** -0.09 3.24 -1.21 
(4.63) (-0.06) (1.92) (-1.58) 
Returns to all strategies are reported in terms of annualized percentage returns. Respective t-statistics are 
reported below the returns in parenthesis. Unconditional expected returns are estimated using ex-ante 
available information only, in an expanding window. 36 months are required to form initial estimates for 
the individual stocks. 120 return month are required to form initial estimates for the portfolio data. 
Return = returns to the momentum strategy, C = returns to the cross-covariance strategy, O = returns to the 
autocovariance strategy, 𝜎𝜇𝛾 = returns to the unconditional expected return strategy. 
CRSP = Individual US stock data, FF6 = Six market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, 
FF25 = 25 market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, Ind10 = 10 industry portfolios, Ind30 
= 30 industry portfolios. 
Statistical significance is denoted by stars: * = 0.05 level of significance, ** = 0.01 level of significance. 
 
This effect of lifetime historical returns reverting to the mean is likely closely related 
to the long-term reversal effect documented by DeBondt and Thaler (1985). Since we 
have a relatively large amount of stocks with short return histories in the sample, the 
unconditional expected return strategy ends up being somewhat of a proxy for long-
term reversal. Furthermore, the inconsistencies between the decomposition and the 
strategy returns provide further support for the argument that extreme return 
observations drive most of the apparent variation in unconditional expected returns for 
individual stocks.  
The Fama and French portfolios provide a more ambiguous picture. Results are 
inconsistent with both results from the other datasets, and the decomposition results 
for the Fama and French portfolios in subsections 5.1 and 5.3. Returns to the 
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unconditional expected return strategy in table 6 are positive, statistically significant 
and very similar in size to the returns of a momentum strategy over the same period. 
In other words, an investor is about equally well off investing into the Fama and French 
portfolios based on their full historical returns as they are investing based on their 
recent returns. Conversely, an investor cannot earn significant returns on an 
autocovariance strategy, where unconditional expected return estimates are deducted 
from momentum returns. Returns to the cross-covariance strategy are also statistically 
insignificant. The results from the strategy-based decomposition suggest, that 
momentum in these characteristics-sorted portfolios is likely more a manifestation of 
size and value factor returns, unrelated to the momentum phenomenon in individual 
stocks and industry portfolios. The return autocovariances found in the decomposition 
estimates are likely caused by a different kind of time-series dependence in these factor 
returns. Further examination of these findings is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
5.4.3 Return regressions 
While the autocovariance strategy is the only ex-ante investable component strategy 
with positive and statistically significant returns for the individual stocks and industry 
portfolios, the returns are much smaller than true momentum returns. Because scaling 
investment into the strategies is difficult, component strategy returns alone are not 
fully informative of the return mechanism driving momentum. I provide further 
evidence on the return mechanism by regressing momentum strategy returns on the 
component strategies. Because component strategy returns have high correlations with 
each other, multiple regression would run into a collinearity problem. Instead I regress 
momentum strategy returns against the individual component strategies separately and 
compare regression coefficients and regression intercepts. The intercepts are reported 
in terms of annualized percentage returns and can be interpreted as the return of the 
momentum strategy left unexplained by the component strategy it is regressed on.  
Panel A of table 7 reports regression results for momentum in individual stocks. 
Regression coefficients between the strategies provide further support for the view that 
momentum is driven by positive return autocovariances. The regression coefficients 
between momentum and the time-series components are particularly informative. For 
individual stocks, the autocovariance strategy has a significant positive coefficient 
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with the momentum strategy, while the cross-covariance strategy has a large negative 
regression coefficient with momentum. These coefficients are consistent with positive 
autocovariances driving momentum. When momentum experiences high returns, the 
autocovariance strategy returns are high and vice versa. 
Table 7. Regression coefficients and intercepts for return regressions 
Panel A Momentum returns regressed on component strategy returns,  individual stock data, 1926-
2018 
Dependent Intercept C O 𝜎𝜇𝛾 
Mom 
10.52** -0.41**   
(5.84) (-5.59)   
Mom 
6.28**  0.70**  
(4.25)  (10.47)  
Mom 
12.10**   0.35* 
(6.19)   (2.08) 
O 
5.39*   -0.14 
(2.58)   (-0.70) 
Panel B Regression intercepts, portfolio data 1926-2018 
Independent FF6 FF25 Ind10 Ind30 
C 
5.15** 4.96** 3.90** 7.25** 
(4.53) (4.40) (2.98) (4.82) 
O 
4.78** 4.63** 2.31 5.37** 
(4.42) (4.35) (1.90) (4.00) 
𝜎𝜇𝛾 
4.39** 4.31** 4.13** 7.35** 
(3.94) (3.78) (3.05) (4.87) 
Panel A reports regression coefficients from linear regressions, using strategies formed on individual 
stocks. The strategy used as the the dependent variable in the regression is reported on the first column. 
Regression intercepts are reported in terms of annualized percentage returns. Respective t-statistics are 
reported below the returns in parenthesis. The t-statistics are computed using standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, following Newey and West (1987).  Mom = momentum strategy, C 
= cross-covariance strategy, O = autocovariance strategy, 𝜎𝜇𝛾  = unconditional expected return strategy. 
Panel B reports regression intercepts from linear regressions, using strategies formed on portfolio data. All 
regressions in panel B have returns to momentum strategy as the dependent variable. The first column 
reports the strategy used as the independent variable.  
FF6 = Six market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios, FF25 = 25 market capitalization and 
book-to-market sorted portfolios, Ind10 = 10 industry portfolios, Ind30 = 30 industry portfolios. Statistical 
significance is denoted by stars: * = 0.05 level of significance, ** = 0.01 level of significance. 
 
The negative coefficient between the cross-covariance strategy and momentum is 
explained by the fact, that the auto-covariance and cross-covariance strategies are 
almost perfectly negatively correlated. When stock returns exhibit occasional 
reversals, returns are negative for the autocovariance strategy, and positive for the 
contrarian cross-covariance strategy, and when returns exhibit continuations, returns 
are positive for the autocovariance strategy and negative for the cross-covariance 
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strategy. This supports the view that cross-covariances and autocovariances move 
together, consistent with Boudoukh, Richardson & Whitelaw (1994), who contend that 
cross-covariances across stocks should, to most extent reflect the relationship between 
asset-specific autocovariances and contemporaneous covariances.12 Because the 
contemporaneous covariances across stocks are positive, return continuations result in 
both autocovariances and cross-covariances being positive. Conversely, reversals 
result in both being negative. 
The regression intercepts in Panel A of table 7 show that none of the individual 
component strategies does a particularly good job of capturing momentum returns. 
Momentum earns economically large and statistically significant positive returns over 
each component strategy, and returns are affected little by adjusting for exposures on 
the component strategies. Unexplained returns for the autocovariance strategy are the 
smallest. The returns of the momentum strategy are virtually unchanged when 
adjusting for exposures to the cross-covariance strategy. When adjusting for exposure 
to the unconditional expected return strategy, momentum strategy returns increase. 
The improved returns are intuitive, because the unconditional expected return strategy 
returns are negative and the momentum strategy has a significant positive regression 
coefficient with the unconditional expected returns. The intercept returns here can be 
interpreted as returns to a momentum strategy that controls for the fact, that stocks full 
return histories tend to revert to the mean.  
The poor performance of the component strategies in explaining momentum returns, 
even in a regression setting is puzzling. In a regression setting, the scaling is unlikely 
to affect inference as much. A potential explanation is that, unlike the momentum 
strategy, the component strategies require an estimate of the unconditional expected 
return. Because of short return histories, extreme return observations and potentially 
                                                 
12 More precisely, Boudoukh et. al (1994) suggest, that if past returns to asset i contain no additional 
information beyond asset j’s past returns, the cross-correlation between the assets can be written as 
𝑐𝑜𝑟(𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑟𝑗,𝑡) =  𝑐𝑜𝑟(𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1, 𝑟𝑗,𝑡) × 𝑐𝑜𝑟(𝑟𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑟𝑗,𝑡). They find that this prediction is very consistent with 
the first-order cross-correlations found in weekly returns across size-sorted portfolios. 
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time-varying unconditional expected returns, these estimates are bound to be noisy. 
Intuitively, introducing noise to the strategy weights should affect returns negatively. 
The autocovariance strategy weights depend negatively on the unconditional expected 
return estimates. Thus, a possible explanation for the profitability of the 
autocovariance strategy in the individual stocks is that it picks up its returns by 
negatively loading on the unconditional expected return strategy. The last row in Panel 
A of table 7 addresses this concern. Regressing the returns of the autocovariance 
strategy on the returns of the unconditional expected return strategy results in an 
insignificant regression coefficient, and a large and statistically significant intercept 
for the autocovariance strategy. Thus, the positive returns to the autocovariance 
strategy are not driven by the unconditional expected return strategy. 
Panel B of table 7 reports regression intercepts for the portfolio data from similar return 
regressions. Regression coefficients are left unreported but provide similar inference 
as above. The component strategies capture even less of momentum returns in 
portfolios than in individual stocks. When adjusting for exposures to the 
autocovariance strategy, momentum returns in the industry portfolios are significantly 
diminished from the returns seen in table 6. Returns are virtually unaffected by 
adjustments for exposures on the cross-covariance and unconditional expected returns 
strategies, providing some support for momentum driven by positive autocovariances. 
For the Fama and French portfolios regression intercepts do not differ much from the 
original momentum returns, when controlling for any of the component strategies. 
Intercepts for the unconditional expected return strategy are the smallest. However, 
the differences in intercepts are too small for reliable inference to be made. 
5.5 Time-variance in the return mechanism 
The empirical results discussed above do not require that mechanism is consistent over 
time and the results can be interpreted as the average contributions of component 
strategies to momentum over the entire sample period. However, the return mechanism 
may change over time. I now examine this potential time-evolution in the return 
mechanism, by examining the decomposition over different time periods in the sample. 
I focus on individual stocks and the strategy-based decomposition, which naturally 
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allows for time-variance in autocovariances, cross-covariances and unconditional 
expected returns. I study both strategy returns, as well as return regressions over 
different time periods. 
Figure 1 plots 10-year rolling annualized returns of the component strategies using 10-
year rolling estimates of the unconditional expected return. Figure 2 plots the log 
cumulative returns of the component strategies, using 10-year rolling estimates of the 
unconditional expected return, as well as momentum returns over the same time-
period. Both figures show the component strategy returns are highly volatile pre-1940. 
Thereafter, the autocovariance strategy yields high and positive returns fairly 
consistently throughout the entire sample period up until around 1990s. Returns to the 
autocovariance strategy then begin a steady decline around the time that the effect is 
initially documented in the literature by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Returns to the 
cross-covariance strategy are mostly negative during the early part of the sample but 
are mostly positive post-1980. Returns to the cross-covariance strategy decline 
similarly to the autocovariance strategy post-2000. 
The slow decline in time-series predictability of returns might be indicative of 
increasing arbitrage activity related to momentum. This result is consistent McLean 
and Pontiff (2016), who find that anomalies tend to attenuate after they are discovered. 
The results are also consistent with recent evidence by Baltussen, Bekkum and Da 
(2019), who find that daily index level return autocovariance has declined around the 
world.13 
                                                 
13 Baltussen, Bekkum and Da (2019) connect their findings with the increase in index investing. 
Furthermore, they study daily autocorrelation of the market index, while I focus on a much longer 
horizon. 
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Figure 1. 10-year rolling annualized percentage returns of component strategies. 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative returns of momentum and component strategies. 
We see from figure 1 that the negative returns to the unconditional expected return 
strategy are fairly consistent throughout the sample period. However, a significant 
portion of the negative returns are driven by very poor performance around the turn of 
the century. The cumulative return plot in figure 2 reveals that these negative returns 
are related to the stock market crash just after 2000. This is likely related to the tech 
bubble around the turn of the century. In the late 1990s, many new stocks enter into 
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the sample. Because stock returns during the late 1990s were very high,  the 
unconditional expected return strategy assigns large positive weights to new stocks, 
because of their high lifetime returns. During the stock market crash, many of these 
stocks realize large losses and a significant portion of the companies fail. We can see 
from figure 2, that the losses from this brief period account for around a third of the 
cumulative losses of the unconditional expected return strategy over the entire sample 
period from 1926 to 2018. 
Panel A of table 8 presents strategy returns over five 20-year subperiods in the sample. 
Results largely support the inference above. Autocovariance-strategy returns are 
positive and statistically significant in only 2 of the 20-year periods, in 1940 to 1959 
and 1980 to 1999. These results are consistent with the weaker performance of the 
autocovariance strategy that we observe in figure 1 during the early part of the sample, 
in the 1960s and post-2000.  Returns to the cross-covariance strategy increase over 
each 20-year period. The returns are, however, statistically insignificant in all periods, 
except from 1980 to 1999. Furthermore, the autocovariance strategy returns are 
slightly larger over the 1980 to 1999 period. The returns to the unconditional expected 
return strategy are negative in all periods but the negative returns are statistically 
significant only in the last two 20-year periods from 1980 to 2018. 
Overall, the autocovariance and cross-covariance strategy returns suggest that 
momentum is consistently driven by positive autocovariances. The 1980s, however, 
seems to mark a notable shift in return cross-covariances, as the returns to the cross-
covariance strategy rapidly turn towards positive and also remain mostly positive after 
this period. This shift is clearly visible in figure 1 as well. At the same time returns to 
the autocovariance strategy returns decline but remain positive. It is possible that the 
return mechanism driving momentum changes. Since both component strategy returns 
remain positive, intuitively, momentum returns should remain positive as well.  
To provide a simple test, of whether cross-covariances explain momentum in the later 
part of the sample I repeat the return regressions on the early and late parts of the 
sample separately. If momentum is indeed driven by cross-covariances in the late 
sample, this should show up in the return regression coefficients. Figures 1 and 2 
provide little guidance in selecting a breakpoint, so I elect to split the sample from the 
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year that Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) initially document momentum. If a structural 
shift would occur in the mechanism, it could potentially explain the underwhelming 
regressions results seen in subsection 5.4.3 as well, because a linear regression fails to 
capture structural changes.  
Table 8. Decomposition of momentum returns in different sample periods, momentum in 
individual stocks. 
Sample period Mom C O 𝜎𝜇𝛾  
 Panel A: Strategy-based decomposition across different sample periods 
1926-1939 
4.48 -8.11 11.57 -4.41 
(0.47) (-0.72) (0.92) (-0.71) 
1940-1959 
10.92** -2.95 7.37* -0.91 
(4.62) (-1.18) (2.48) (-0.73) 
1960-1979 
13.80** -0.31 7.03 -3.51 
(4.26) (-0.10) (1.79) (-1.67) 
1980-1999 
19.86** 3.95* 5.97* -5.62* 
(6.66) (2.17) (2.21) (-2.55) 
2000-2018 
-0.24 1.90 0.23 -9.05** 
(-0.05) (0.71) (0.05) (-2.70) 
 Panel B: Strategy return regressions before and after 1993 
1926-1992 
10.43** -0.34**   
(6.69) (-5.45)   
7.76**  0.65**  
(5.95)  (14.43)  
1993-2018 
2.77 -0.43**   
(0.67) (-4.20)   
1.32  1.14**  
(0.50)  (8.81)  
Returns to all strategies and component estimates are reported in terms of annualized percentage returns. 
Respective t-statistics are reported below the returns in parenthesis. In panels A and C, the strategies are 
formed using unconditional expected returns estimated using ex-ante available information only. The 
estimates are formed in a 120-month rolling window with 36 return months required to form initial 
estimates. The sample period column reports the years of the sample period under study.  
In panel A: Mom = momentum strategy returns over the period, C = the contribution of cross-covariances 
to momentum, O = the contribution of autocovariances to momentum,  
𝜎𝜇𝛾  = the contribuution of cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected returns.  
In panel B: Mom = regression intercept of momentum strategy over component strategy, C = regression 
coefficient of the cross-covariance strategy and C = regression coefficient of the autocovariance strategy. 
The intercepts are reported in terms of annualized percentage returns. Respective t-statistics are reported 
below the coefficients in parenthesis and computed using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation, following Newey and West (1987).   
Statistical significance is denoted by stars: * = 0.05 level of significance, ** = 0.01 level of significance. 
 
 
 
Regression results are reported in Panel B of table 8. The momentum column 
represents regression intercepts, while regression coefficients of the cross-covariance 
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and autocovariance strategies are reported in their respective columns.  Although the 
cross-covariance strategy is more profitable in the later part of the sample, the 
regression coefficients are negative and highly statistically significant over both 
subsamples. Conversely, autocovariance strategy coefficients remain positive and 
highly statistically significant. We do not observe any structural shift that would be 
consistent with return cross-covariances explaining momentum returns. To the extent 
that return cross-covariances turn negative and contribute positively to momentum, 
this positive contribution is subsumed by autocovariances that also turn negative. In 
unreported tests, I try a variety of other cutoff points from 1980 onwards for splitting 
the sample and find similar results. Interestingly, regression intercepts of momentum 
over both the cross-covariance and autocovariance strategies are economically small 
and statistically insignificant in the 1993 to 2018 sample period. This is, however, most 
likely only reflective of the fact that momentum returns are small in the latest part of 
the sample.14  
5.6 Robustness checks 
I conclude the empirical part of my thesis by exploring the sensitivity of my results to 
a variety of methodological choices. For these robustness checks, I focus on the main 
dataset consisting of individual stock returns. Following the advice of Fama and 
French (2008), I first examine my results across different market capitalization groups. 
For this robustness check, I study both the unconditional decomposition with 
winsorized returns and the strategy-based decomposition. The rest of the robustness 
checks focus on methodological choices in constructing the component strategies in 
the strategy-based decomposition. 
5.6.1 Decomposition across market capitalizations 
In my main results, I exclude microcap stocks (stocks below the 20th percentile of 
market capitalization). Table 9 contains decomposition results using the full sample 
                                                 
14 Indeed, splitting the sample in 1980 instead results in positive and statistically significant regression 
intercepts. 
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with these microcaps included, as well as separately across four different market 
capitalization groups. Panel A of table 9 reports the results of the strategy-based 
decomposition. Panel B of table 9 reports the unconditional decomposition results 
using winsorized returns. The results in both panels confirm that my main results are 
not driven by any particular market capitalization group. For all size groups, except 
for microcaps, the results from both decompositions are consistent with earlier results. 
Consistent with prior literature, returns to momentum decrease as we move from 
smaller to larger market capitalization groups. The estimated contribution of positive 
autocovariances diminishes in a similar fashion. Returns to the autocovariance strategy 
are statistically insignificant among the largest market capitalization quintile of stocks. 
Table 9. Decomposition of momentum across market capitalizations. 
Size Mom C O  𝜎𝜇𝛾 
 Panel A: Strategy-based decomposition 
All stocks 
4.64* -0.53 4.65* -10.08** 
(2.08) (-0.28) (2.00) (-5.96) 
Mega 
6.23** 0.59 2.96 -1.97 
(3.06) (0.38) (1.50) (-1.30) 
Large 
8.50** 0.16 4.48* -3.58** 
(4.19) (0.10) (2.16) (-2.65) 
Small 
12.93** -1.59 7.91** -4.74** 
(6.59) (-0.76) (3.24) (-4.19) 
Micro 
-8.15* -0.03 -0.39 -13.58** 
(-2.39) (-0.01) (-0.12) (-4.53) 
 Panel B:  Lo and MacKinlay (1990) decomposition, using winsorized returns 
All stocks  -1.23* 7.80** 5.37** 
Mega  0.72 2.77** 1.05** 
Large  0.58 5.85** 1.97** 
Small  -3.78** 12.86** 4.12** 
Micro  -6.80** 6.19** 8.80** 
Returns to all strategies and component estimates are reported in terms of annualized percentage returns. In 
Panel A, respective t-statistics are reported below the returns in parenthesis. The strategies in Panel A are 
formed using unconditional expected returns estimated using ex-ante available information only. The estimates 
are formed in an expanding window with 36 return months required to form initial estimates . 
The size column reports the market capitalization group. All stocks = full sample of individual stocks from the 
CRSP dataset, with microcaps included, Mega = Stocks in the top 20th percentile of market capitalization, 
Large = Stocks with market capitalization above the median market capitalization, Small = stocks between the 
20th and 50th percentile of market capitalization, Micro = stocks in the smallest 20th percentile of market 
capitalization. 
Mom = momentum returns, C = the contribution of cross-covariances to momentum, O = the contribution of 
autocovariances to momentum, 𝜎𝜇𝛾= the contribuution of cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected 
returns. 
In panel B, returns for the CRSP dataset are winsorized at the 90% threshold.  
Statistical significance is denoted by stars: * = 0.05 level of significance, ** = 0.01 level of significance. 
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The reversals found in the unconditional expected return strategy seem to be more 
pronounced in smaller market capitalization quintiles and especially large for the 
microcap stocks. Conversely, the estimates of cross-sectional variation in 
unconditional expected returns in Panel B of table 9 are positive but much larger for 
smaller market capitalization stocks. This suggests that much of the variation observed 
in unconditional expected returns are driven by the smallest stocks in the sample. 
Furthermore, because the reversals seen in the strategy-based decomposition are 
stronger, when variation in unconditional expected returns is stronger, it is likely that 
the unconditional expected return estimates are driven by extreme return observations 
and short samples. This is likely reflective of the high positive correlation between 
market capitalization and the length of return history. Smaller stocks have shorter 
return histories and are more affected by the small-sample bias. 
In the microcap quintile, instead of momentum we observe large and statistically 
significant reversals in returns. The auto- and cross-covariance strategy returns are 
both essentially zero. The negative returns to the unconditional expected return 
strategy are larger than momentum returns and highly statistically significant. 
However, the unconditional decomposition results in Panel B of table 9 suggest the 
opposite. When we pull in the extreme return observations, we find positive auto- and 
cross-covariances in returns. The results suggest that microcap stocks have such 
extreme individual return observations and short return histories, that estimating time-
series dependence or unconditional expected returns is very difficult. The 
unconditional expected return estimates used to form the time-series strategies are not 
informative of true unconditional expected returns and time-series component 
strategies trade mostly based on noise. 
5.6.2 Robustness to scaling the strategy weights 
In subsection 4.5.2., I discuss, how scaling investment in the component strategies, can 
affect returns. Scaling the investment in the strategies affects the decomposition 
results, because it imposes conditionality on the cross-sectional dispersion of the 
weights. Furthermore, the time-series component strategies are not zero net investment 
strategies and scaling the weights represents a challenge. As a robustness check, I 
explore alternative methods of scaling investment into the strategies. 
84 
Table 10 contains decomposition results using three different methods of scaling the 
strategy weights. No scaling corresponds to returns to strategies in which strategy 
weights are not scaled from period to period. The investment size varies based on the 
return dispersion and the components should correspond exactly to the 
autocovariances, cross-covariances and unconditional expected returns, with the 
distinction, that the unconditional expected return is computed using out-of-sample 
data. Indeed, we can see that the component strategy returns add up to the realized 
return of the momentum strategy. Returns to momentum are much smaller when 
investment is not scaled. Returns to an unscaled momentum strategy are very small 
compared to the return of the scaled strategy. Momentum returns are, however, still 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Table 10. Returns to component strategies using different methods of scaling the investment 
weights in the strategies, from 1926 to 2018. 
Scaling method Mom C O 𝜎𝜇𝛾 
No scaling 
1.43** -0.30 2.08 -0.35** 
(3.38) (-0.28) (1.66) (-3.72) 
Momentum 
scaling 
10.47** 5.48 6.74 -1.75** 
(5.31) (0.60) (0.65) (-2.86) 
Always 1$ long 
or 1$ short 
10.47** 0.12 9.13** -4.66** 
(5.31) (0.05) (3.61) (-3.69) 
Returns to all strategies are reported in terms of annualized percentage returns. Respective t-statistics are 
reported below the returns in parenthesis. The strategies are formed using unconditional expected returns 
estimated using ex-ante available information only. The estimates are formed in an expanding window with 
36 return months required to form initial estimates.  In the scaling method column, No scaling corresponds 
to strategies, in which investment is not scaled from period to period, Momentum scaling corresponds to 
strategies, where investment into the component strategies is scaled based on the scaling of the momentum 
strategy, by 𝑠𝑡 = 2 ∗ ∑
1
|𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11 −𝑟?̅?−2
11 |
𝑁
𝑖=1 , and Always 1$ long or 1$short corresponds to strategies, where the 
component strategies are scaled such that they are either $1 long or $1 short every period, and the 
maximum investment is $1 long, $1 short.  
Mom = returns to the momentum strategy, C = returns to the cross-covariance strategy, O = returns to the 
autocovariance strategy, 𝜎𝜇𝛾 = returns to the unconditional expected return strategy. 
Statistical significance is denoted by stars: * = 0.05 level of significance, ** = 0.01 level of significance. 
 
Not scaling the strategy weights results in both of the time-series component strategies 
in taking up to 2.37 times leverage. At other times, when cross-sectional return 
dispersion is small, there is essentially no investment at all. The component strategy 
returns without scaled investment do not contradict the main results. Only the returns 
to the autocovariance strategy are positive. While the autocovariance strategy returns 
are only statistically significant at the 10% level, the cross-covariance strategy returns 
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are small by comparison and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The negative 
returns to the unconditional expected return strategy are much smaller when the 
investment is not scaled, but remain statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Momentum scaling corresponds to strategies in which component strategies are scaled 
similarly to the momentum strategy, by 𝑠𝑡 = 2 ∗ ∑
1
|𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11 −?̅?𝑡−2
11 |
𝑁
𝑖=1  . Once again the 
component strategy returns add up to the momentum returns. Returns to the 
autocovariance and cross-covariance -strategies are large, but statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. The time-series component strategies now take on 
positions that are levered up to 9 times. Because the strategy weights are mostly 
affected by 𝑠𝑡, and the weight dispersion in the cross-covariance strategy is small, the 
cross-covariance strategy loses its interpretation as a contrarian market-timing strategy 
and resembles more a market-timing strategy based on cross-sectional return 
dispersion. Consistent with earlier results, returns to the unconditional expected return 
strategy are negative and statistically significant, albeit small. 
The last row in table 10 alters the scaling to the cross-covariance and autocovariance 
strategies are scaled such that they are either $1 long or $1 short every period, and the 
maximum investment is $1 long, $1 short. For the cross-covariance strategy, this 
essentially means that the strategy is $1 short (long), whenever the 11-month 
cumulative returns of the equally weighted returns are above (below) the mean of 
historical 11-month cumulative returns of the equally weighted index with no middle 
ground. Returns to the autocovariance strategy are now highly statistically significant 
and comparable in size to momentum returns over the same period. Cross-covariance 
strategy returns are once again indistinguishable from zero. The scaling, and thus, the 
returns of both momentum and the unconditional expected return strategy are the same 
as in the main results.  
To summarize the results from table 10, the method of scaling component strategy 
weights is quite influential on the investment into the strategies, and thus the strategy 
returns. However, the results are most supportive of positive return autocovariances 
driving momentum, regardless of how investment into the strategies is scaled.   
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5.6.3 Robustness to methods of estimating the unconditional expected return  
Forming the strategy weights requires an estimate of unconditional expected return. In 
this subsection, I show that my results are not sensitive to any particular choice of 
estimation window for the unconditional expected return. Table 11 presents the 
strategy returns and respective t-statistics using different estimates of the 11-month 
unconditional expected returns.  All OOS corresponds to an unconditional expected 
return estimate of the mean of all 11-month mean cumulative return observations, 
except for the 11 months, when the holding period returns enter the 11-month 
cumulative return. This means that the strategies are of course not investable, because 
they include future information in to the unconditional expected return estimates.  
Forward-looking corresponds to estimates, where only post-holding return 
observations are used to form unconditional expected return estimates. 120/24 
corresponds to 120-month rolling estimates with an initial 24 months required. 60 
required corresponds to investable strategies, where we require 60 observations to 
form initial estimates on the unconditional 11-month expected return. 12 required 
corresponds to investable strategies where only 12 observations of the 11-month 
cumulative return are required.  
Momentum returns in table 11 differ from earlier, because the return observations in 
the beginning of each return series are not consumed to form initial estimates. All 
momentum returns are, however, similar in magnitude and significance as earlier. The 
autocovariance strategy earns positive and statistically significant returns at the 5% 
level across all estimates of the unconditional expected return, except for when we 
require longer than 60 months of return history. The strategy returns, excluding the 60 
month required estimates, are also similar in magnitude regardless of the unconditional 
expected return estimate used. Returns to the respective cross-covariance strategies are 
small by comparison and are statistically insignificant in all cases. 
Requiring a 60-month initial return history to estimate unconditional expected returns 
appears to have an effect on auto- and cross-covariance strategy returns. Because 
return histories are on average short, the 60 month requirement restricts, restricts the 
number of stocks in the sample to around half of the original.  Positive returns to the 
autocovariance strategy in this sample of stocks are small and only statistically 
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significant at the 10% level. Cross-covariance strategy returns are positive unlike for 
all other specifications, but remain statistically insignificant. It appears, that stocks 
with longer return histories have on average lower autocovariances and negative cross-
covariances. Momentum returns are significantly diminished as well, suggesting that 
momentum is stronger among stocks with shorter return histories. This is likely due to 
the positive correlation between market capitalization and short return histories and 
the fact that momentum is stronger in smaller capitalization stocks. 
Table 11. Momentum and component strategy returns in individual stocks from 1926 to 2018, 
using different estimates of the unconditional expected return to form the strategy weights. 
Estimate of µ Mom C O 𝜎𝜇𝛾 
All OOS 
9.65 -0.54 5.85 -8.35 
(4.76) (-0.29) (2.52) (-8.24) 
Forward-looking 
11.05 -1.82 7.47 -4.95 
(5.46) (-0.99) (3.25) (-5.20) 
120/24 
10.47 -0.50 6.08 -4.45 
(5.31) (-0.28) (2.79) (-3.49) 
60 required 
8.48 1.01 3.59 -4.03 
(4.36) (0.58) (1.69) (-3.36) 
12 required 
11.29 -0.71 6.67 -3.94 
(5.75) (-0.41) (3.11) (-3.24) 
Returns to all strategies are reported in terms of annualized percentage returns. Respective t-statistics are 
reported below the returns in parenthesis. The rows represent different methods of estimating the 
unconditional expected return. All OOS = Unconditional expected return estimates using all return 
observations, except for the holding period return, Forward-looking = unconditional expected return 
estimates formed on post-holding period returns, 120/24 = unconditional expected returns estimates using 
ex-ante available information only, estimated in a 120-month rolling window, with 24 months required to 
form an initial estimate, 60 required = expanding window, ex-ante estimates of the unconditional expected 
return with 60 months required to form an initial estimate, 12 required =  expanding window, ex-ante 
estimates of the unconditional expected return with 12 months required to form an initial estimate.   
Mom = returns to the momentum strategy, C = returns to the cross-covariance strategy, O = returns to the 
autocovariance strategy, 𝜎𝜇𝛾= returns to the unconditional expected return strategy. 
Statistical significance is denoted by stars: * = 0.05 level of significance, ** = 0.01 level of significance. 
 
     
The unconditional expected return strategy generates highly statistically significant 
and negative returns across all unconditional expected return estimates. The negative 
returns are in fact larger, when we include future returns to the unconditional expected 
return estimates, even when we only use future information. This result is interesting, 
as it suggests that stocks with positive (negative) individual extreme return 
observations earn below (above) average return throughout their existence, and returns 
to the unconditional expected return strategy are not entirely driven by long-term 
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reversals. This evidence is consistent with findings by Bali, Cakici and Whitelaw 
(2011) and Boyer, Mitton and Vorkink (2010), who show that investors prefer stocks 
with positively skewed returns and require a return premium for holding stocks with 
negatively skewed returns. Further examination of these findings is left for future 
research. 
This effect can also potentially explain the negative bias present in estimates of return 
autocovariances. For example, consider a stock that realizes a high positive return in 
one period. This high return realization then results in a higher average return over the 
stocks lifetime. Now, because the stock’s returns in other periods are on average low, 
the subsequent return is likely to be below the stock’s average return. When both time-
series predictability and the dispersion in the stocks’ returns is smaller in other periods, 
these single occurrences can drive the sample autocovariance estimates towards being 
negative. 
5.6.4 Other formation and holding periods of momentum 
Prior literature on momentum varies in their choice of formation period and holding 
period for momentum. I conclude the robustness checks by exploring the robustness 
of my results to these methodological choices. Table 12 presents the strategy-based 
and unconditional decomposition results, using different variants of momentum. 6/6 
represent momentum strategies, where the holding period and formation periods are 
both six months, and a month is skipped between the formation and holding periods. 
6/6 without skipping a month is the same strategy, with adjacent formation and holding 
periods. 6/1 is a momentum strategy with a six month formation period and a one 
month holding period, with one month skipped in between. 12/1 without skipping 
corresponds to a momentum strategy without one month skipped in between formation 
and holding periods. All returns to momentum strategies are positive, statistically 
significant and economically large. All returns are, however considerably smaller at 
around half of the return to the 11-month momentum strategy that skips a month before 
the holding period.  
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Table 12. Momentum and component strategy returns in individual stocks from 1926 to 2018 
with different holding periods and formation periods used to form the strategy weights. 
Strategy Mom C O 𝜎𝜇𝛾 
6/6 
5.35 0.30 2.65 -4.72 
(2.42) (0.21) (1.40) (-4.50) 
6/6 Without 
skipping a month 
4.60 1.77 0.80 -3.74 
(2.13) (1.15) (0.39) (-3.20) 
6/1 
6.39 1.71 1.90 -3.39 
(3.29) (0.97) (0.85) (-2.60) 
12/1 without 
skipping 
5.83 -1.52 5.30 -4.35 
(2.76) (-0.83) (2.36) (-3.45) 
Returns to all strategies are reported in terms of annualized percentage returns. Respective t-statistics are 
reported below the returns in parenthesis. The strategies are formed using unconditional expected returns 
estimated using ex-ante available information only. The estimates are formed in an expanding window with 
36 return months required to form initial estimates. The rows represent momentum and component 
strategies with different holding and formation periods.  6/6 = strategies using the past 6-month cumulative 
return as the measure of momentum and a 6-month holding period, with one month skipped between the 
formation and holding periods, 6/6 Without skipping a month = strategies using the past 6-month 
cumulative return as the measure of momentum and a 6-month holding period, without one month skipped 
between the formation and holding periods, 6/1=   strategies using the past 6-month cumulative return as 
the measure of momentum and a one month holding period, with one month skipped between the formation 
and holding periods, 12/1 without skipping = strategies using the past 12-month cumulative return as the 
measure of momentum and a one month holding period, without one month skipped between the formation 
and holding periods. 
Mom = returns to the momentum strategy, C = returns to the cross-covariance strategy, O = returns to the 
autocovariance strategy, 𝜎𝜇𝛾 = returns to the unconditional expected return strategy. 
Statistical significance is denoted by stars: * = 0.05 level of significance, ** = 0.01 level of significance. 
 
While the results in table 12 do not contradict earlier results, the autocovariance 
strategy returns appear quite sensitive to the choice of formation period. 
Autocovariance strategy returns are only statistically significant for the momentum 
strategy with a 12-month formation period, without a month skipped. Returns are 
rendered insignificant when the return horizon is reduced to 6 months. A likely 
explanation for the reduced performance of both the autocovariance strategy and 
momentum at shorter horizons is a spillover effect from short-term reversals. Novy-
Marx (2012) finds that, in US individual stocks, momentum returns are mostly driven 
by the months between 7 and 12 months prior to the holding period. Goyal and Wahal 
(2015) show that this effect is caused by reversal effects from returns two months prior 
to the holding period. This effect is stronger for the autocovariance strategy than for 
momentum, in part due to the autocovariance strategy returns being smaller than 
momentum returns.  Cross-covariance strategy returns remain statistically 
indistinguishable from zero across all strategy specifications. Returns to the 
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unconditional expected return strategy are negative and highly statistically significant 
across all strategy specifications, consistent with earlier results. 
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6 SUMMARY 
In this thesis, I study momentum, one of the most widely documented phenomena in 
the cross-section of stock returns. I begin with a review of prior literature on 
momentum in general. I cover empirical evidence on momentum, theories proposed to 
explain momentum and literature studying cross-sectional and time-series 
determinants of momentum returns. I conclude my literature review with a discussion 
on the literature focused on return dynamics that drive momentum. More specifically, 
the returns to a momentum strategy can be decomposed into three drivers of return: 
positive return autocovariances, negative return cross-covariances and the cross-
sectional variation in unconditional expected return. Understanding which of these 
components drives momentum returns is important in distinguishing between theories 
on momentum, because all theories on momentum need to make an implicit 
assumption on the return mechanism. I review both the theoretical framework and 
prior empirical evidence on the decomposition of momentum returns. 
Empirically, I examine the decomposition of momentum returns in US individual 
stocks and portfolios of US stocks in a sample extending from 1926 to 2018. I add to 
prior literature on decomposing momentum returns by suggesting two novel methods 
that allow for estimating the decomposition for individual stocks. The first one 
involves estimating cross-covariance matrices and the decomposition in a rolling 
window. The second is a strategy-based decomposition, based on analytically solving 
for three separate strategies that depend only on autocovariances, cross-covariances 
and unconditional expected returns, respectively. This strategy-based decomposition 
allows me to decompose momentum returns without estimating a cross-covariance 
matrix. 
I implement a bootstrap experiment that provides evidence that the sample estimates 
of cross-covariance matrices used in prior research suffer from biased estimation. I 
find that estimates of the contributions of unconditional expected returns and return 
cross-covariances are positively biased, while estimates of the contribution of return 
autocovariances are negatively biased. My findings on cross-covariances and 
autocovariances are novel to the literature. I link these biases to extreme return 
observations, by examining the decomposition using winsorized returns. I show that 
92 
the biases are reduced, when unconditional expected returns and cross-covariances are 
estimated using winsorized returns. Decomposition estimates of the contributions 
using winsorized returns suggest that momentum is mostly driven by positive 
autocovariances in returns. 
The strategy-based decomposition provides a different interpretation to these biases as 
forward-looking biases. Employing the component strategies using ex-ante available 
information results in an unbiased decomposition. Using the strategy-based 
decomposition, I find consistent evidence that momentum is driven by positive 
autocovariances in both individual stocks, as well as portfolios of stocks sorted by 
industry. I show that these results are consistent over time and robust to a variety of 
methodological choices. 
My results are consistent with behavioral explanations for momentum, where 
momentum is caused by underreaction to new information by market participants. 
However, my results do not preclude a rational explanation for momentum. Many 
rational theories proposed in the literature likewise imply that momentum is driven by 
positive return autocovariances. While the return mechanism behind momentum is 
important to asses, further work is needed to distinguish between competing theories 
on momentum. Different theories generate different testable implications and testing 
many theories jointly remains an important challenge in better understanding 
momentum. 
While I find consistent evidence across individual stocks and industry portfolios, 
evidence on what drives momentum in the Fama and French characteristic-sorted 
portfolios are inconclusive. Evidence from the standard decomposition suggests that 
momentum in these factor portfolios is driven by positive return autocovariances, but 
the strategy-based decomposition show that an investor is equally well off investing 
into the Fama and French portfolios based on unconditional expected return estimates 
instead. It is likely that, while momentum in individual stocks and industry momentum 
are similar phenomena, momentum in characteristic-sorted portfolios is somewhat 
distinct from other forms of momentum. Research dedicated to studying momentum 
in portfolios related to factor returns is sparse and represents an interesting area to 
further pursue. 
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The strategy-based decomposition also allows for time-varying contributions of the 
return mechanisms to momentum. In analyzing the time-variance I find no consistent 
evidence of a time-shift in the mechanism behind momentum. I find that, while the 
contribution of autocovariances declines and the contribution of cross-covariances 
increases in the latter part of the sample, at the same time, the profitability of 
momentum declines as well. Furthermore, momentum returns remain positively 
correlated with the autocovariance strategy. These result suggest that despite negative 
cross-covariances contributing positively, their effect is subsumed by a negative 
contribution from negative autocovariances. I also find a steady decline in time-series 
predictability of returns after 1990s that can explain the poor recent performance of 
momentum strategies. However, my examination of the attenuated momentum returns 
and time-series predictability is parsimonious. The recent performance of momentum 
and its implications for future returns is an important topic for future literature to 
assess. 
I also document an interesting phenomenon, where a stocks lifetime returns negatively 
predict its current returns. A similar reversal effect is present and significant when 
using pre-holding period returns, post-holding period returns or both in estimating 
lifetime returns. These findings potentially add to prior literature on long-term 
reversals in returns, as well as literature on investors preference for assets with 
positively skewed returns over assets with negatively skewed returns. Exploring these 
reversal-effects in lifetime returns are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, further 
work linking t findings to prior literature is warranted. 
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Appendix 1 
STRATEGY AND DECOMPOSITION DERIVATIONS 
Decomposition of momentum 
Following Lo and MacKinlay (1990):  
𝜋𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑(𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?𝑡−2
11 )𝑟𝑖𝑡 
𝑁
𝑖=1
  
where πt is the momentum return in month t, N is the number of assets, rit  is the return 
of asset i at time t, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11  is the cumulative 11-month return of asset i two months prior 
to t, and ?̅?𝑡−2
11  their equally weighted average. This can be rewritten as 
𝜋𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑(𝑟𝑡−2
11 𝑟𝑖𝑡) −
𝑁
𝑖=1
1
𝑁
∑(?̅?𝑡−2
11 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1
  
=
1
𝑁
∑(𝑟𝑡−2
11 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ ?̅?𝑡−2
11 ?̅?𝑡 
Taking expectations yields 
𝐸[𝜋𝑡] =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐸[𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11  𝑟𝑖,𝑡]
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝐸[?̅?𝑡−2
11 ?̅?𝑡] 
=
1
𝑁
∑(𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝑟𝑖,𝑡−2
11 , 𝑟𝑖𝑡] + 𝜇𝑖𝜇𝑖
11)
𝑁
𝑖=1
− (𝐶𝑜𝑣[?̅?𝑡−2
11 , ?̅?𝑡] + ?̅? ?̅?
11)  
where 𝐶𝑜𝑣 denotes covariance, μi is the unconditional expected monthly return of 
asset i and 𝜇𝑖
11 is the unconditional expected 11-month return of asset i. This can again 
be rewritten as 
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𝐸[𝜋𝑡] =
1
𝑁
𝑡𝑟(𝛺) −
1
𝑁2
1′𝛺𝑘1 + 𝜎𝜇𝛾. 
Here, 1 denotes an (𝑁 ×  1) vector of ones, 𝛺 is the autocovariance matrix 𝛺 ≡
𝐸[(𝑟𝑡−2
11 −  𝛾)(𝑟𝑡 − 𝜇)′] and the notation 𝑡𝑟(. ) denotes the trace of a matrix. In this 
equation, the first term is the cross-sectional average of the kth-order autocovariances 
of the individual securities, the second term is the autocovariance of the equal-
weighted market index, and the third term 𝜎𝜇𝛾 is the cross-sectional covariance 
between the unconditional 11-month expected returns, 𝛾 = 𝐸[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
11] and the 
unconditional 1-month mean returns 𝐸[𝑟𝑖,𝑡], and represent the contribution of variation 
in unconditional expected returns. The above equation can be further rearranged into: 
𝐸[𝜋𝑡] =
𝑁 − 1
𝑁2
𝑡𝑟(𝛺) −
1
𝑁2
[1′𝛺𝑘1 − 𝑡𝑟(𝛺)] + 𝜎𝜇𝛾 , 
𝐸[𝜋𝑡] = 𝐶 + 𝑂 +  𝜎𝜇𝛾 . 
Derivation of the individual strategy weights 
The weights to our strategies are given by 
𝑤𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?𝑡−2
11 ) . 
This can be rewritten as  
𝑤𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑁
((𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11) − (?̅?𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?11)) +
1
𝑁
(𝜇𝑖
11 − ?̅?11) 
        = 𝑤𝑜+𝑐 + 𝑤𝜎 , 
where 𝑤𝑜+𝑐 =
1
𝑁
((𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11) − (?̅?𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?11)), are the weights to a strategy that only 
exploits time-series dependence in returns of momentum and 𝑤𝜎 =
1
𝑁
(𝜇𝑖
11 − ?̅?11) are 
the weights for a strategy that only depends on the unconditional expected returns of 
the assets. 
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The weights for the time-series strategy can further be rewritten as 
𝑤𝑜+𝑐 =
1
𝑁
(
𝑁 − 1
𝑁
 (𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11) − (?̅?𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?11 −
1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11))) 
           =
𝑁 − 1
𝑁2
(𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11) −
1
𝑁
(?̅?𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?11 −
1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11)) 
          = 𝑤𝑜 + 𝑤𝑐 
where, 𝑤𝑜 =
𝑁−1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11) are the weights for a strategy that exploits return 
autocovariances and 𝑤𝑐 =  −
1
𝑁
(?̅?𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?11 −
1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11)) are the weights for a 
strategy that only depend on cross-covariances among stocks.  
Decomposition of the unconditional expected returns strategy 
Using the same notation as above, 
𝜎𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑(𝜇𝑖
11 − ?̅?11)𝑟𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝐸(𝜎𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑ (𝐸(𝜇𝑖
11𝑟𝑖) − 𝐸(?̅?
11𝑟𝑖))
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
=
1
𝑁
∑(𝐸(𝜇𝑖
11𝑟𝑖) − ?̅?
11𝜇𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
= 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖
11, 𝜇𝑖)  
 
 
Decomposition of the autocovariance strategy 
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Using the same notation as above, 
 
𝑂𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑
𝑁 − 1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑖𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11)𝑟𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝐸(𝑂𝑡) =
𝑁 − 1
𝑁2
∑(𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑡−2
11 𝑟𝑖𝑡) − 𝐸(𝜇𝑖
11𝑟𝑖𝑡))
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
=
𝑁 − 1
𝑁2
∑(𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖𝑡−2
11 𝑟𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖
11𝜇𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖
11𝜇𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
=
𝑁 − 1
𝑁2
∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖𝑡−2
11 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
=
𝑁 − 1
𝑁2
𝑡𝑟(Ω) 
Decomposition of the cross-covariance strategy 
Using the same notation as above, 
𝐶𝑡 = −
1
𝑁
∑ (?̅?𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?11 −
1
𝑁
(𝑟𝑖𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11)) 𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝐶𝑡 = −
1
𝑁
∑(?̅?𝑡−2
11 − ?̅?11)𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
+
1
𝑁2
∑(𝑟𝑖𝑡−2
11 − 𝜇𝑖
11)𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝐸(𝐶𝑡) = −
1
𝑁
∑(𝐸(?̅?𝑡−2
11 𝑟𝑖𝑡) − 𝐸(?̅?
11𝑟𝑖𝑡))
𝑁
𝑖=1
+
1
𝑁2
∑(𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑡−2
11 𝑟𝑖𝑡) − 𝐸(𝜇𝑖
11𝑟𝑖𝑡))
𝑁
𝑖=1
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𝐸(𝐶𝑡) = −
1
𝑁
(𝑐𝑜𝑣(?̅?𝑡−2
11 ?̅?𝑡) + ?̅?
11?̅? − ?̅?11?̅?) +
1
𝑁2
∑(𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖𝑡−2
11 𝑟𝑖𝑡))
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝐸(𝐶𝑡) = −
𝑐𝑜𝑣(?̅?𝑡−2
11 ?̅?𝑡)
𝑁
+
1
𝑁2
∑ (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖𝑡−2
11 𝑟𝑖𝑡))
𝑁
𝑖=1
) 
𝐸(𝐶𝑡) = −
1′Ω1 − tr(Ω)
𝑁2
 . 
